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"Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights":
Creating Educated and Democratic Juries
THE HONORABLE B. MICHAEL DANN*
Jurors are rarely brilliant and rarely stupid, but they are treated as both at
once.'
[A] growing body of research [demonstrates] that courts are ignorant of
social science, may be hostile to using it as a basis for legal policy, and
prefer to base laws on expediency, precedent, and intuition.2
The field cannot well be seen from within the field?
INTRODUCTION
Appraisals of trial by jury have almost always produced mixed results. On
the one hand, there has been strong sentiment toward, if not reverence for, the
institution of the jury and its place in the democratic firmament. We see no
serious effort to abolish trial by jury or even to restnct the right in complex
civil cases.4
However, concerns and complaints about jury trials, and how such trials
impact and empower juries in deciding cases, continue to abound. Most critics
focus on juror competence, doubting the ability of the average juror to
understand, remember, and integrate all the information (evidence and law)
given to them in modem-day litigation. Recently, criticism over the way
jurors are treated during trials and deliberations has seemed to reach a
crescendo, spawning numerous studies and prompting many calls for changes
* Judge, Mancopa County Superior Court, Phoenix, Arizona. B.S., 1961, Indiana University;
L.L.B., 1966, Harvard University; M.J.S., 1992, University of Virginia Law School.
I. William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CH. LEGAL F. 119, 137 (quoting
Warren K. Urbom, Toward Better Treatment of Jurors By Judges, 61 NEB. L. REv. 409, 425 (1982)),
reprinted in 132 F.R.D. 575, 590 (1991).
2. J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions Following
Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 155, 166 (1991).
3. RALPH W. EMERSON, Circles, in ESSAYS & LECTuREs 403, 409 (Joel Porte ed., 1983).
4. For a history of the debate of the so-called "complex case" exception to the Seventh
Amendment, see ARTHuR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM 3-7 (1984).
For recent calls for the elimination of juries in some complex cases, see Steven J. Friedland, The
Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 190 (1990); Joseph C.
Wilkinson, Jr. et al., A Bicentennial Transition: Modern Alternatives to Seventh Amendment Jury Trial
in Complex Cases, 37 KAN. L. REV. 61 (1988). See generally Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension
of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727 (1991).
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in the traditional jury trial format.5 Judges, lawyers, law teachers, social
scientists, jurors themselves, and others have called for an end to the
traditional passive role of the juror and urged the utilization of several
techniques intended to create more juror participation in trials. Critics claim
that these changes will enhance the educational atmosphere in trials and will
better enable jurors to comprehend and justly resolve disputes. Many complain
that the problem is not with juries but with jury trials and the adversarial
process.6 Jurors must be allowed greater roles in trials if juries are to remain
up to the task of resolving today's disputes and if the institution of trial by
jury is to retain its vitality
The aim of this Article is to add to these many discussions in at least four
ways. First, I demonstrate how and why the role of the jury changed over
time from one of active participation to one of passivity today These changes
occurred primarily because of the gradual seizure of power and control over
the trial by lawyers and judges and the simultaneous development of the
adversarial trial. The retention ofjuror passivity is now thought to be essential
to the preservation of the adversarial trial in its present form. Thus,
implementation of many of the suggestions commentators have made to
improve the jury trial process would be seen as "threatening" the current
balance of power that judges and lawyers have over the trial itself, a
disquieting prospect to many judges and lawyers. This power and control is
jealously guarded, in large part, due to the inherent distrust of juries harbored
by many lawyers and judges. However, the jury, a key democratic institution,
could in fact be strengthened by a reallocation of such power and control.
Second, I demonstrate that modem social science research and commonly
accepted principles of psychology and education have exploded traditional
legal assumptions and myths about juror behavior in general and learning and
decision making by juries in particular. These research findings and accepted
classroom techniques should cause those of us involved in trial work-judges,
lawyers, and court administrators-to reexamine how we conduct jury trials,
5. Recent influential works and studies include: Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases, 1989
A.B.A. LiTiG. SEC. REP. [hereinafter A.B.A. REPORT]; AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y, ToWARD MORE
ACTIVE JURIES: TAKING NOTES & ASKING QUESTIONs (1991); AUSTIN, supra note 4; JOHN GUINTHER,
THE JURY IN AMERICA (1988); SAUL M. KAsSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY
ON TRIAL. PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1988); MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PiCUS, THE DEBATE OVER
JURY PERFORMANCE (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1987); Friedland, supra note 4; Symposium, The
Role of the Jury in Civil Dispute Resolution, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F I (see especially Schwarzer, supra
note I).
6. E.g., KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 215-16; SELVIN & PICUS, supra note 5, at 45-46
& n.7; Mark A. Frankel, A Trial Judge's Perspective on Providing Tools for Rational Jury
Decisionmalang, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 221 (1990); Arthur D. Austin, Why Jurors Don't Heed the Trial,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1985, at 15.
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with a view to improving the educational component of trials and the quality
of verdicts.
Next, I briefly survey the most commonly suggested techniques for
improving juror participation at trial. After noting the social science data and
legal arguments regarding each one, I assess their value in terms of their
potential for enhancing the educational objective of the trial and a democratic
courtroom.
Finally, I propose and discuss two techniques that have received only
modest or, in one instance, no attention in the otherwise nearly exhaustive
literature on this subject. Both ideas deserve and require further evaluation,
such as field testing where results can be quantified and compared to control
groups. Both procedures hold much promise: (1) permitting jurors to discuss
the evidence as it is received, but only among themselves and after being
instructed to withhold any decision on the outcome; and (2) asking jurors who
are at an impasse and heading toward deadlock whether court or counsel can
be of help to them in reaching a verdict by addressing issues of fact or law
that divide them. These procedures have the potential for increasing juror
understanding and recollection of evidence and, in the latter case, avoiding
needless and costly mistrials due to juries that hang. If we give jurors an
opportunity to ask for and receive help, they might be able to conclude such
cases accurately and fairly
I. FROM ACTIVE TO PASSIVE:
A PRODUCT OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE TRIAL
Early English juries were extremely active in the trial process. The gradual
transformation in the jury's role was due in large part to a struggle for power
and control over the trial that was successfully waged by lawyers and judges.
The resulting model for American juries, and one that by and large is still
followed today, severely compromises the jury's ability to understand the
evidence and law and to render an accurate verdict. Although these restric-
tions also denigrate the jury as a democratic institution-because they help
perpetuate the near complete control by lawyers and judges thought necessary
to sustain the present adversarial trial system-change remains difficult.
A. The Early Jury
The jury had its origin not in England, but on the Continent. Frankish
royalty relied upon local members of the community to respond to summonses
to appear before the king to report on local conditions. Called the inquisitio,
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citizens participated by informing, not deciding. It was this active model for
the jury that was exported to England as a result of the Norman Conquest. 7
The earliest English juries bore a striking resemblance to their counterpart,
the inquisitio, at least in terms of composition and activism. Beginning with
the reign of William the Conqueror, and for hundreds of years thereafter,
juries consisted of neighbors summoned by the sheriff to settle a dispute, not
by judgment, but by "declar[ing] the truth" on the basis of their own
knowledge.8 Referred to as "the country,"9 these jurors were "integrated into
the fabric of the proceedings." Beginning with the sheriff's call," those
summoned were expected to investigate the facts if they did not know them;
indeed, talking with the parties and among themselves about the case prior to
trial was commonplace for jurors.2
By the late thirteenth century, this form of jury trial had reached its
apex. 3 At about this same time, the requirement that the juror have prior
firsthand knowledge of the case began to be relaxed. Juries began to receive
evidence in court and to consider statements in the pleadings and of counsel
while retaining the ability to ask questions of the witnesses. 4 As time
passed, jurors came to rely more and more upon trial testimony and other
evidence, and by the sixteenth century use of sworn witnesses was the
norm.'5 A century or two later, jurors were considered strictly judges of the
facts, not witnesses.' 6 Nevertheless, jurors continued to ask questions of
7. 1 WILLIAM HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312 (1903); I FREDERICK POLLOCK
& FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 140-42 (2d ed. 1898) (noting that
Englishmen have a "disinclination to admit that this 'palladium of our liberties' is in its ongin not
English but Frankish, not popular but royal').
8. BLACKSTONE's COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 673-77 (Bernard C. Gavit ed., 1941) [hereinafter
BLACKSTONE]; I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 138-43.
9. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 673 (discussing trial per pais, or by "the country'); 2 POLLOCK
& MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 623 (explaining that, by bringing a question before a jury, the parties
agreed to "be bound by a verdict of the country").
10. Austin, supra note 6, at 18.
11. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 674; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 621 (noting that
the sheriff was directed to summon those "through whom the truth of the matter may be best known").
12. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 677; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 624-27 (stating
that the call was received well before trial so jurors would have time to "certify themselves" of the
facts).
13. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 620, 641.
14. Id. at 628; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 334.
15. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 334 (stating that sworn testimony was general practice in the
16th century); THEODORE F. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF COMMON LAW 129-30 (Little, Brown,
5th ed. 1956) (1929) (discussing the nature of jury examination).
16. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 336; Joseph M. Hassett, A Jury's Pre-trial Knowledge in
Historical Perspective, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 158-60 (1980); cf FED. R. EVID. 606(a)
(prohibiting modem jurors from being witnesses in case).
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witnesses without the permission of the court. In fact, juror questions could
not be prohibited by the judge, given the jurors' oath to get at the truth.1 7
Early juries exercised considerable clout in England, the Magna Carta
having enshrined the right to trial by jury in civil and criminal cases."8
Lacking in rules of evidence and other directions from the judge, the jury's
rationale was inscrutable. Its verdict was virtually unreviewable, and
compared to the judgment of the Divine.19 It is against this tradition of
powerful and active juries that the legal and judicial professions began to
assert themselves and to impose legal constraints upon powerful and
traditionally active juries.
B. The Struggle for Control Over Trials in England
Advocates trained in law did not appear at trials in any great numbers until
the fourteenth century, well after jury trials had become commonplace. 20 Nor
did rules of evidence, directions from the court, or other positive legislation
exist to constrain medieval juries.2 ' The slow, evolutionary change of jurors
from witnesses of the facts to judges of the facts22 reduced juror activism.23
While the emerging trial bar may have had a helping hand in this evolution,
the bench imposed the first known overt restriction upon juries-the writ of
attaint. If the judge disagreed strongly enough with a jury's returned verdict,
the judge could use a writ of attaint. The jury would be imprisoned, and the
verdict vacated, on the theory that the jurors perjured themselves in their
capacities as witnesses. 24 As intended, the inhibiting effect upon juries was
direct and substantial. As the role of the jury changed, however, this severe
17. DANIEL ROLLINS, THE ENGLISHMAN'S RIGHT: A DIALOGUE N RELATION TO TRIAL BY JURY
19-20 (1883).
18. Id. at 13.
19. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 7, at 317 (noting that the jury verdict "inherited the inscrutability of
the judgments of God").
20. Morrs S. Arnold, Lmv and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, 18 AM.
J.L. HIsT. 267, 274 (1974).
21. Id. at 275, 279.
22. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text; see also Murray Levine et al., The Impact of
Rules of Jury Deliberation on Group Decision Processes, in PERSPECTIVES N LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY:
THE TRIAL PROCESS 263, 264 (Bruce D. Sales ed., 1981) (discussing the change from decisions based
on personal knowledge to evidence presented); JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY § 34,
at 50-51 (1876) (discussing jurors as judges of the facts). Other reasons for this shift in roles remain
obscure. "Demographic changes and resulting logistical limitations were also thought to play a role."
Lisa M. Harms, Comment, The Questioning of Witnesses by Jurors, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 138 (1977)
(stating that juries could only consider in-court evidence).
23. Austin, supra note 6, at 18.
24. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 337-41; William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries:
Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REV. 731, 733-34 (1981); Harms, supra note 22, at 138.
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and controversial remedy was used less and less until it was finally abolished
in 1670 in Bushell's Case.25
Although the procedure of attaint was important in that it marked the first
major effort at asserting legal control over juries, its use cannot account solely
for the change in the role of jurors. The abolition of attaint, which was
replaced by the motion for new trial as a means of providing judicial
oversight of the jury's verdict, is thought to have substantially reduced juror
activism. 26 The trend toward hearing most, and soon all, of the evidence in
court was accelerated since the judge could only compare the verdict to the
evidence if the judge had heard the evidence in court.27
However, it was the emergence of a professional trial bar, and what
followed in the way of rules and procedures for trials, that had the greatest
impact on the future role of juries. By mid-sixteenth century, an "elite lawyer
class arose, jealous of its prerogatives and insistent on preserving for itself the
function of law making and law finding. 28 During this time, lawyers' guilds
were at their strongest, and "the struggle for control over the jury came to a
head.21 9 Numerous controls over the jury's relative autonomy and activism
were put in place by the architects and stewards of an emerging adversary
system. Rules of evidence emerged as a way of limiting and controlling the
information available to the jury and how it was received. Thus, jurors
became dependent on others for facts, "modem courts hav[ing] learned the
method of evidence."30 As the methods of jury selection were refined,3 l the
practice of challenging jurors for cause arose.3 2 Case-specific legal instruc-
tions and other directions from the judge became commonplace,33 along with
25. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670); see HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 340-41, 345-46.
26. Jeffrey S. Berkowitz, Note, Brealang the Silence: Should Jurors be Allowed to Question
Witnesses During Trial?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 117, 123-24 (1991); Harms, supra note 22, at 138-39.
27. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 341-42; Schwarzer, supra note 24, at 733-34 (discussing jury
decisions based on trial evidence rather than personal experience); Harms, supra note 22, at 138
(discussing jury consideration of only evidence presented before judge).
28. Arnold, supra note 20, at 279.
29. Id.
30. MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, PAPERS ON THE LEGAL HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT 183 (1920).
Much of the supply of facts which the old jury had to draw upon has been put out of court,
and confusion has been added to much that has been kept. It comes to this: the old jury had
a complete supply of material not properly prepared; the modem jury has an incomplete supply
of material properly prepared.
Id. "[R]ules of evidence represent the most careful attempt to control the processes of communication
to be found outside a laboratory." Edward W. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5
VAND. L. REv. 277, 282 (1952).
31. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 336 (discussing increased organization in the trial system).
32. Id. at 336-37.
33. See Schwarzer, supra note 24, at 733-34.
1234 [Vol. 68:1229
EDUCATED & DEMOCRATIC JURIES
the device of discharging deadlocked juries.34 Appellate review was added,
the effect of which was to further control jury action.3"
C. "Coming to America"
Vestiges of English juror activism in the fact-finding process were thought
to last until the early eighteenth century 36 Thus, the jury model available to
the colonies was one based on almost total jury passivity No later than the
early seventeenth century, at about the time King James provided for trial by
jury in his first instructions to the Colony of Virginia,37 the process of jury
transformation was thought complete. No longer active witnesses to the facts,
jurors had become passive judges of what evidence the parties chose to
present and which proof the law of evidence allowed. 38 This transition, from
the role of an active fact finder "integrated into the fabric of the proceeding"
to that of a "passive fact finder" required to passively listen to and choose
between the parties' evidence, has been characterized as ironic39 and
illogical.40
Many of the customs and practices surrounding English jury trials at the
time of colonization were eventually inherited by the new nation and
enshrined as interpretive materials to the Sixth and Seventh Amendments'
guarantees of trial by jury "' Our centuries-old inheritance continues to
influence, if not control, current judicial customs and rituals concerning jury
trials.42 To this inheritance the legal system has added an "elaborate set of
rules designed to regulate the traffic of information in the courtroom."43
These customs, rituals, and rules combine to produce a well-orchestrated jury
trial, but one of questionable efficacy given that they support a model of the
34. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 347.
35. See Schwarzer, supra note 24, at 733-34.
36. Hassett, supra note 16, at 163.
37. LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, "PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY" 97-101 (2d ed.
1988).
38. PROFFATr, supra note 22, 50-51; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 334-36; PLUCKNETr, supra
note 15, at 130.
39. Austin, supra note 6, at 18.
40. Berkowitz, supra note 26, at 123-24.
41. SeeTull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,417 (1987); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
384-87 (1979).
42. KAssIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 215-16; SELVIN & Picus, supra note 5, at 63; Roger
W. Kirst, Finding a Role for the Civil Jury in Modem Litigation, 69 JUDICATURE 333, 333-34 (1986);
Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 145-46; David U. Strawn & G. Thomas Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A
Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 483 (1976).
43. KAssiN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 65.
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jury that is excessively passive." As-will be demonstrated at greater length
below,4" enforced passivity interferes with learning and reduces opportunities
for jurors, individually and collectively, to perform to their potential as
community representatives and decision makers in trials of criminal and civil
cases.
46
D. Resistance to Change
Despite overwhelming evidence from social science research 47  and
accepted truths about the educational process, 4 the legal establishment
remains largely resistant to proposals that would modify the present trial
model to allow for more juror participation in general and improved
communications with jurors in particular.49 Indeed, there are even reported
instances of courts moving in directions contraindicated by the empirical
data. °
Without identifying all the reasons why the legal establishment is often
resistant to change,5 ' it appears that (1) the investment that lawyers and
judges have in the historical (and now current) model of the adversarial jury
trial and (2) the inherent distrust of juries that is a part of that model are the
main causes for resisting suggestions to expand the role and power of the
jury The fear of losing total control over the trial and fact-finding processes
44. Id. at 131, 215-16. The problem ofjuror understanding is further compounded by the tendency
of judges, lawyers, and expert witnesses to "speak an esoteric and mysterious language in front of a
passive audience." AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 100.
45. See infra notes 78-103 and accompanying text.
46. See AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 100-04; KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 131, 215-16.
47. See infra notes 83-103 and accompanying text.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 108-12.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 83-103. As an example, the American Bar Association's
1992 draft of Standards for Trial by Jury contains only modest proposals for enhancing the jury's role
at trial-juror note-taking, the furnishing of written copies of instructions, and permission for the judge
to instruct prior to closing arguments. STANDARDS FOR TRIAL BY JURY §§ 15-3.2, 15-3.2(a), (b) & (f)
(Am. Bar Ass'n Working Draft 1992).
50. Tanford, supra note 2, at 166.
5 1. Among the reasons that have been offered are the following: the inherent conservatism of the
profession, Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 120; an attitude of "ownership" of the adversary process and of
possession of all information necessary to carry out that stewardship; the results of legal education; the
deeply ingrained notion that any change in the law requires precedent; a strong preference for the
certainty of the status quo over an uncertain future; and the tendency of lawyers and judges to take a
"risk-averse" position in order to avoid reversals. It has also been postulated that many lawyers and
judges do not trust jurors enough to concede to them this additional power. Frankel, supra note 6, at
223; Friedland, supra note 4, at 208-09.
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prompts too many lawyers and judges to reject even the most modest of
proposals.52 Whether or not the result is intended, a principal effect of
failing to communicate more effectively with jurors is the disempowerment
of the jury, not only in a particular case but also as an institution.
It is natural that the "owners" of, and participants in, the current adversary
system would become defensive upon learning of repeated claims that the lack
of juror comprehension is caused, in large part, by the adversary system itself.
But that is what judges and lawyers are heanng. 3 Given the level and nature
of the resistance to changing the system, what is needed, according to some,
is a major attitude change within the legal profession-one that breaks with
the "Law and Nostalgia" movement and refuses to be controlled by the
past; 54 one that is willing to weigh the value to be gained by relinquishing
some forms of control over the trial process to the jury; s and one that gives
52. While trial procedures have not significantly changed in the last 100 years, reform efforts have
been "lavished" upon pretrial procedures during the past three decades. See David U. Strawn & G.
Thomas Munsterman, HelpingJuries Handle Complex Cases, 65 JUDICATURE 444,444 (1982), reprinted
in IN THE JuRY Box 181, 186 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman et al. eds., 1987). This phenomenon is entirely
consistent with my thesis. Reforming trial procedures in the ways suggested here and elsewhere would
require lawyers and judges to share power and control with jurors, who are not "players" in the
adversarial trial process. These reforms result in a net loss of power and control to the legal profession.
However, no such loss is experienced in reforming pretrial procedures since power and control is simply
reallocated among the players themselves; none is lost to "outsiders." Therefore, one would expect the
players' resistance to change to be lower and their motivation to improve their own lot to be higher.
53. See AUSTiN, supra note 4, at 100-04; KASSrN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 131, 215-16;
SELVIN & PicUS, supra note 5, at 45-46 & n.7; Strawn & Munsterman, supra note 52, at 447, reprinted
in IN THE JURY Box, supra note 52, at 186; Cecil et al., supra note 4, at 755; Frankel, supra note 6,
at 222; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 119-20; Austin, supra note 6, at 18.
Interestingly, a recent monumental work in this area concluded that jurors are often confused about
the evidence, law, and procedure for evaluating and deciding the case. Fourteen separate changes or
additions to jury trial procedure are recommended, all without criticizing the adversary system by name.
See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5. However, given the nature and number of suggested changes, there
was no need to make explicit that which was clearly implicit. The study was commissioned and
underwritten by the ABA Litigation Section.
54. Kirst, supra note 42, at 333-34.
[There is] a common assumption that any change in the role of the jury has to satisfy a
historical test rigidly bound to pre-1791 practice. Such an assumption is disastrous if the jury's
role is to keep pace with changes outside the civil courtroom. .Historicism must be avoided
if the courts are to be free to experiment to find the correct role for the jury in modem
litigation.
Id., see also Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 145-46. Thus, the history of the jury does not serve as a useful
guide for current policy. Marianne Constable, What Books About Juries Reveal About Social Science
and Law, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 353, 363, 370 (1991). Apropos of the need to be open to the
possibility of breaking with the past, especially when considering changes in the systems for delivery
of justice, former Chief Justice Warren Burger encouraged judges to "stretch the mind" when
considering new ideas and to avoid thinking that because "we've always done it that way," improvement
is foreclosed. Remarks at Dedication of Arizona Courts Building (Jan. 29, 1991) (copy on file with the
Indiana Law Journal).
55. See Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 120.
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proper weight to the trial's educational objective. 6 "The traditional advocacy
mentality is inconsistent with comprehension. Trial lawyers must first
accept the necessity of replacing the adversarial priority with the educational
objective, and, secondly, must adopt procedures that bring the jury into the
trial as active participants in education."57 By rising above perceived self-
interest and realizing that a strengthened jury enhances the judicial system as
a whole, 8 the legal profession contributes to an important democratic
institution and helps ensure its place in our system of justice.s9
II. "LEARNING LESSONS" FROM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
AND EDUCATORS
60
[T]he mental life plays too important a role in court procedure to reject
the advice of those who devote their work to the study of these func-
tions.
Although social scientists began offering their services to courts almost one
hundred years ago, their efforts did not bear much, if any, fruit. Influential
contemporary legal commentators criticized social scientists for their failure
to support their claims with hard empirical data.62 What may have been true
then about the lack of relevant and reliable research concerning jurors and
trials, however, is no longer the case. The 1966 University of Chicago Jury
Project, the landmark work of Professors Kalven and Zeisel,63 inspired and
set the standard for almost three decades of work by social scientists and
others who have subjected the trial process to close examination."
56. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 100-01.
57. Id. at 101; see also Cecil et al., supra note 4, at 764-65 (suggesting that many of the jury's
problems may be attributable to limitations placed on the "decision-making environment" by the
adversary system).
58. Walter W Steele & Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate, 74 JUDICATURE 249, 254 (1991).
59. Friedland, supra note 4, at 207-08; Strawn & Munsterman, supra note 52, at 447, reprinted in
IN THE JURY Box, supra note 52, at 186; see Barry Gewen, Democracy in the Courtroom, NEW
LEADER, Sept. 8, 1986, at 15, 15.
60. The term "learning lessons" is borrowed from HUGH MEHAN, LEARNING LESSONS: SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION IN THE CLASSROOM (1979).
61. HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 117 (1908).
62. See, e.g., John H. Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 U.
ILL. L. REv. 399 (1909).
63. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
64. This work is said both to have sparked "the modem field of jury studies" and to have "deeply
influenced contemporary understanding of the jury as an institution." Valene P. Hans & Neil Vidmar,
The American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 323, 323 (1991). Replication of the
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In recent years, the jury trial and juror behavior have been scientifically
examined with a great variety of concerns in mind.65 Most of the published
works deal with the question of juror competence and proposals to improve
it. Of these studies, the great majority focus upon the active-passive juror
dichotomy and the consequences of each model upon juror comprehension.
This latter research is the principal concern of this Part.
A. The Irrational Legal Model of the Juror
Applying a strictly legal analysis, the law's "ideal juror" is a creation of
laws, procedures, rules of evidence, legal instructions, admonitions, and the
like. However, much of that legal underpinning is based on assumptions or
Kalven and Zeisel work is needed, given the intervening changes in the American jury, such as greater
representativeness of the community, smaller juries, increases in the amount of technical and complex
evidence, societal changes (for example, civil rights, feminism, and crime), and the increased
controversy surrounding the civil jury. Id. at 347-49. For another call to validate these earlier findings
through future research, see Peter D. Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us: Studying Judges' and
Juries'Behavior, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 775, 800 (1991) (arguing that future study of the jury is made all
the more necessary by "the dramatic changes that have occurred with regard to the function,
composition, and role of the jury over the last several decades").
Since publication of The American Jury, a variety of traditional and nontraditional data-gathering
techniques have been employed by social scientists and others studying cognitive processing by jurors.
See, e.g., A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 2-4 (studying alternatejuies in four complex cases; post-trial
interviews of actualjurors, judges, and attorneys; and writtenjury questionnaires); GUINTHER, supra note
5, at 68-69 (recounting an experiment that allowed jurors to question witnesses and take notes); SELVN
& PIcUS, supra note 5 (discussing a case study of a complex asbestos trial); Austin, supra note 6
(discussing the Cleveland Jury Project, a study of two juries in a complex antitrust case); Leonard B.
Sand & Steven A. Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the
Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423 (1985) (reporting experiments followed by surveys of
participating attorneys and judges); Lawrence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving theAbility
ofJurors to Comprehend and Apply Crimnal Jury Instructions, 17 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 153, 161 (1982)
(discussing a study of questions asked by deliberating juries and surveys of judges and jurors); Strawn
& Buchanan, supra note 42, at 480 (reporting an experiment involving 116 members of a jury pool);
The View from the Jury Box, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at Sl (surveying 783 jurors, almost two-thirds
of which were jurors in criminal cases). Complaints were common among researchers about the almost
uniform opposition ofjudges and lawyers to allowing observation of deliberating juries in actual cases.
65. See JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990) (studying the effects of manner of expression by witness
upon decision maker); Raymond W. Buchanan et al., Legal Communication: An Investigation of Juror
Comprehension of Pattern Instructions, 26 COMM. Q. 31 (1978); John M. Conley et al., The Power of
Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375 (studying the effects upon
jurors of witnesses' testimonial styles); Saul M. Kassin, The American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit
of Justice, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 687 (1990) (reporting the effects on a jury of nonevidentiary social
influences); Saul M. Kassin et al., The Dynamite Charge: Effects on the Perceptions and Deliberation
Behavior of Mock Jurors, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 537 (1990); Gary L. Wells et al., The Timing of the
Defense Opening Statement: Don't Wait Until the Evidence Is in, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 758
(1985); Lon B. Andrews, Exhibit A: Language, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Feb. 1984, at 28 (explaining how
juror perceptions may be influenced by language styles).
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wishful thinking about human nature, customs and rituals of long standing,
and expectations and beliefs about the present adversary system. The legal
juror model would be rational if it could be validated empirically However,
this has not been done-the law has been slow to embrace empirical
validation. Professor Cleary, a leading authority on the law of evidence, put
it well:
In science a theory possesses a recognized provisional and tool-like
character. If the empirical data collected do not support the theory, the
theory is discarded. Since the law never collects any empirical data, it is
spared the embarrassment of having ever to discard a theory on that
basis.66
Table 1 below lists the attributes of the idealized juror contemplated by the
legal system:
TABLE 1. The "Legal Model" of the Juror
1. Passive-acted upon 67
2. Merely observes
6
3. Empty vessel to be filled
69
4. Object of one-way, linear communication"0
5. Complete and accurate recorder of information
7
'
6. Suspends judgment on evidence and issues until end of case 72
7 Does not give feedback until verdict73
8. Exercises "recall readiness" regarding final instructions
74
9. Considers all evidence75
10. Well-served by adversarial system
76
11. Effective representative of community; role enhances participa-
tive democracy
77
66. Cleary, supra note 30, at 278.
67. PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL. FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 236-37 (1984); GuINmTER,
supra note 5, at 47; KASsiN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 131; Fnedland, supra note 4, at 198.
68. Fnedland, supra note 4, at 198.
69. DIPERNA, supra note 67, at 236.
70. Robert F Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 601,
628; Austin, supra note 6, at 15.
71. See Donald E. Vinson, Litigation: An Introduction to the Application of Behavioral Science, 15
CONN. L. Rv. 767, 775 (1983).
72. REm HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 18-19 (1983); IRWIN A. HORowrrz & THOMAS E.
WILLGING, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW: INTEGRATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 209-10 (1984).
73. See Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV.
273, 278 (1989).
74. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 285-86 (2d ed. 1987).
75. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 72, at 22; WRIGiITSMAN, supra note 74, at 277-83.
76. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 100-01; SELVIN & PICUS, supra note 5, at 45-46.
77. See Fnedland, supra note 4, at 207-08.
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No research-based support can be found for this model in social science,
legal, or political science literature. To the contrary, all of the studies are
critical of this idealized picture, claiming that its assumptions are contradicted
by accepted psychological and educational truths and by empirical data."8
The reported research demonstrates that the consequences of following this
accepted model are relatively disastrous for individual jurors. For example,
juror confusion reportedly runs high, 9 opportunities for learning are
negatively affected,"0 and jurors frequently lose interest and become
distracted and bored.8 i In the absence of juror feedback at trial, court and
counsel remain unaware of whether jurors have been confused by the
evidence, whether they need additional information, and whether they are even
pursuing the right issues.
8 2
B. The Reality-Based Behavioral Model of the Juror
[E]valuating how juries actually function is a strictly empircal matter. We
search for answers not in abstract legal theory and not in trial stones told
by judges, lawyers, and journalists, but in the results of systematic
research.83
Relying on the evidence produced by scientific studies and having as their
goals better-informed jurors and more accurate verdicts, social scientists, law
professors, a few judges, and others paint a far different picture of jurors and
advocate a far different model for the jury than the one now followed in most
courtrooms in this country. They all agree on one thing: jurors must be
permitted to become more active in the trial. 4 By "active," most mean
involving jurors in the fact-finding process through such devices as questions
78. See sources cited infra notes 79-98; CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM:
REPORT FROM AN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCiATIoN/BROOKINGS SYMPOSIUM 16 (1992) [hereinafter
SYMPOSIUM REPORT].
79. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 4; SELVIN & Picus, supra note 5, at 45-46; Austin, supra note
6, at 15, 18-19.
80. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5; Fnedland, supra note 4, at 208-09.
81. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 24-57; see also Fnedland, supra note 4, at 211 (discussing
how to get juries more interested and focused on the trial).
82. Harms, supra note 22, at 130-3 1. I suppose this is self-evident-if you don't ask the question,
you never know what the answer might have been.
83. KAssIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 5.
84. GU NTHER, supra note 5, at 68; HoRowriz & WILLGING, supra note 72, at 210-i1; KASSIN &
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 131; Forston, supra note 70, at 628-31; Friedland, supra note 4, at 204-
20; Austin, supra note 6, at 18-19.
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by jurors of witnesses (asked through the judge),5 note-taking, 6 substan-
tive preliminary instructions, 7 and allowing jurors to have a copy of the
legal instructions.8" Contrary to the passive juror model, where the juror is
expected simply to store information as it comes in, remain open-minded, and
refrain from making judgments about the evidence until deliberations
commence, research shows that jurors do and should be expected to actively
process information during the trial.8 Research also shows that jurors are
likely to mold information into a plausible "story" or "schema" based on their
prior experiences.9 The rate of predeliberation judgments or decisions by
jurors is high.9' The active juror model contemplates juror interaction with
85. AMERICAN JUDICATURE Soc'Y, supra note 5; GUINTHER, supra note 5, at 68-69; Frankel, supra
note 6, at 222-23; Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors' Participation in Trials: A Field
Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 251-57 (1988);
Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 139-42.
86. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 34-37; GUINTHER, supra note 5, at 68-69; KASSIN &
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 128-29; AMERICAN JUDICATURE Soc'Y, supra note 5; Sand & Reiss,
supra note 64.
87. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 49-51; VALERIE P HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY
122-23 (1986); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof-The Timing
of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, in IN THE JURY Box, supra note 52, at 143; Amiram
Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of lt?, I LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
163 (1977); E. Barret Prettyman, Jury Instructions-First or Last?, 46 A.B.A. J. 1066 (1960).
88. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 51-52; Committee on Fed. Courts, New York State Bar Ass'n,
Improving Jury Comprehension in Complex Civil Litigation, 62 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 549, 565 (1988)
[hereinafter NY. State Bar Report].
89. HAsTIE ET AL., supra note 72, at 18-24; HORowITz & WILLGING, supra note 72, at 209-10
("The psychological literature demonstrates that jurors could not be expected to follow the legal model
of information processing. Information is misplaced, misconstrued, embellished, and reorganized. Jurors
will be active participants in the process of listening to evidence.").
The ideal juror is characterized as a relatively passive record-keeper during the trial who
encodes the events of the trial verbatim. Actual juror performance may deviate from
this ideal through mechanisms of selective attention, forgetting, inferential embellishment,
and reorganization. There is always extensive cognitive activity by the perceiver in
comprehension and memory tasks.
HASTIE ET AL., supra note 72, at 18-19 (citations omitted).
90. "One of the techniques jurors seem to use is organizing [their thoughts about the evidence] into
stories that they present during the deliberation among the jurors. These stones [are] usually derived
from personal expienence and 'common sense' "HOROWITZ & WILLGING, supra note 72, at 210;
see also HASTIE ET AL., supra note 72, at 18-24. "The Story Model provides a complete psychological
account of cognitive processing in juror decisionmaking, and it receives support from jury research,
political science analysis, jurors' accounts of their experiences during trials, and other work." Id. at 23
(citations omitted). See generally James A. Holstein, Jurors'Interpretations and Jury Decision Making,
9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83 (1985) (examining how jurors schematize information); Moore, supra note
73, at 273 (noting the effect of this phenomenon on practicing lawyers).
91. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 74, at 286. Research shows that despite cautionary instructions, jurors
"often form very definite opinions" about guilt or innocence before the evidence is concluded. Id.
"Virtually all models of jury decisionmaking assume that individual jurors have reached initial
predeliberation verdict decisions at the start of deliberations. Thus, the input at the beginning of the jury
task is a set of jurors with verdict preferences." HASTIE ET AL., supra note 72, at 24. "One of the earliest
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the judge, attorneys, and others from the time the jurors first report for duty
through the post-trial debriefing.92
Contrary to the negative findings resulting from following the "passive
juror" model,93 studies abound documenting the benefits of permitting more
juror participation in the trial process as suggested by the "behavioral" or
"active juror" paradigm. For example, the active juror is more likely to have
an effective and satisfactory learning experience, and less likely to be
confused or not to remember the evidence or the law " If forms of feedback
are allowed, court and counsel are more likely to learn of confusion,
ambiguities, or omissions in the evidence or instructions before it is too
late.95 Next, surveys show that the more active jurors are at trial, the more
attention they will pay to the proceedings.96 Juror satisfaction with the entire
trial experience is also enhanced by increased participation in the trial. 97
Last, but not least, the institution of the jury is said to be strengthened by
measures that afford jurors more of an opportunity to participate actively at
trial and to accept the corresponding responsibility 98 To some, the issue is
trust. "One inference drawn from these restrictions [of the current system]
(which render the jury totally passive) is that the jury may be entrusted with
findings in mock jury research was that despite judges' instructions to the contrary, many jurors form
tentative verdict preferences early in the trial." Robert J. MaeCoun, Experimental Research on Jury
Decision-Making, 30 JuRiMETRics J. 223, 225 (1990); see also Forston, supra note 70, at 612 (noting
that jurors frequently vote according to their predeliberation decisions); Moore, supra note 73, at 274
(asserting that jurors make predeliberation decisions in a "highly idiosyncratic" way); Litigation
Sciences, Affective and Cognitive Jurors, TRIAL, Dec. 1982, at 92.
92. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 102. "Circular or two-way communication, that is, allowing jurors to
ask questions throughout the trial (including orientation), will improve the accuracy of transmission."
Id. at 102 (citation omitted). Forston, supra note 70, at 628-31 (arguing that jurors ought to have the
right to ask questions of judge, lawyers, and witnesses about the evidence or law); Moore, supra note
73, at 278 (noting that verbal feedback involving jurors would more nearly "accommodate the jurors'
cognitive filters," that is, frames of reference).
93. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
94. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5; HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 87, at 120-24; SELVIN & PICUS,
supra note 5, at 63 n.13; Forston, supra note 70, at 628-31; Friedland, supra note 4, at 209 (noting that
"active learners are more effective than passive ones"). "Experiments have demonstrated with
consistency that the accuracy of information transferred by two-way communication far exceeds the
accuracy of information passed by one-way communication." Forston, supra note 70, at 629; see also
Strawn & Munsterman, supra note 52 (presenting proposals for a more active jury).
-95. AusTiN, supra note 4, at 102-03; Forston, supra note 70, at 631; Harms, supra note 22, at 130-
31.
96. AusTiN, supra note 4, at 102; Friedland, supra note 4, at 211; see also A.B.A. REPORT, supra
note 5, at 35-36.
97. Forston, supra note 70, at 629; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 85, at 233-34,237; see also A.B.A.
REPORT, supra note 5, at 35-36.
98. Friedland, supra note 4, at 206-09.
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the responsibility to decide important matters, but not how to define the
parameters of the decisionmaking process itself."99
Some, including judges, say that trial lawyers and judges are "invested" in
the customs and rituals that severely limit juror participation in the trial.'00
In light of considerable empirical data showing that trials "leave jurors
floundering"'0 ' and that "pervasive confusion" results,'0 2 judges and
lawyers must act with open minds in the broader public interest to address
this critical public policy question. 3
C. What Do Professional Educators Say?
The analogy between the courtroom and the classroom is not a complete one
by any means. However, there are enough parallels to justify a comparison.
For one, the emphasis in the classroom is plainly upon learning. So it is, or,
as we have seen, should be, in the courtroom for jurors. In both instances,
education takes place in a group setting. Similarly, attendance is compulsory
for both students (at least in kindergarten through grade twelve) and jurors.
The aim of the teacher is to impart knowledge and understanding; likewise
with trial lawyers and judges.'0 4 Classroom lessons and trials share the same
structure, which consists of three main components: opening (orientatjpn),
instructional (task conduct), and closingOs Following lessons, specific tasks
are assigned for completion (tests or reaching a verdict).
What is the principal difference? During all three phases of classroom
lessons, interaction or the exchange of information is encouraged, if not
compelled. 0 6 Not so in the courtroom, where jurors are acted upon and are
expected, if not required, to remain passive. ° The positive correlation
between classroom interaction and effective learning has been an accepted
truth for some time,' having found its origins in the work and findings of
99. Id. at 208.
100. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 133-34.
101. Id. at 120.
102. Forston, supra note 70, at 606.
103. MacCoun, supra note 91, at 231.
104. See SYMPOSIUM REPORT, supra note 78, at 16.
105. JUDITH W LINDFORS, CHILDREN'S LANGUAGE AND LEARNING 286-91 (1980); MEHAN, supra
note 60, at 35-49.
106. SARA DELAMONT, INTERACTION IN THE CLASSROOM (John Eggleston ed., 2d ed. 1983);
LINDORS, supra note 105, at 245-47, 270-71, 291-92; MEHAN, supra note 60, at 79-80, 139-60.
107. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
108. DELAMONT, supra note 106, at 17; PHILIP GAMMAGE, TEACHER AND PUPIL. SOME SOCIO-
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 32-34 (1971); LINDFORS, supra note 105, at 286-91; MEHAN, supra note 60,
at 36-41.
1244 [Vol. 68:1229
EDUCATED & DEMOCRATIC JURIES
social and educational psychologists in the mid-1900s. °9 Since the view that
students are only "passive receivers" has been rejected,1 interaction has
become the accepted means of ensuring that students understand what is being
communicated to them. Interaction should evoke questions, focus attention,
motivate students, assist recall, and allow students to benefit from the
exposure to others' views."' Among other things, student-initiated interac-
tions (questions or comments) are thought to serve important ends-for
example, eliciting information, providing information, and giving teachers
direction." 2
Educators also attach significance to context, control, and democracy when
discussing communication in the classroom. In deciding on the optimum form
and amount of interaction or language use for a given situation, the social
context and the function are considered."' Thus, what is expected in a
classroom would probably not be appropriate in a worship service." 4
Arguably, the jury trial falls somewhere in between these two examples, but
somewhere closer to the classroom model given similar learning objectives
and task performance demands. Whether one is discussing classrooms or
courtrooms, considerations of control bear upon the questions of whether,
when, and how to provide for interaction. Control in an authoritarian sense
can.be achieved by strictly limiting feedback, as is done, for example, in
military courtrooms. On the other hand, effective and appropriate classroom
and courtroom control can be achieved, if not enhanced, without sacrificing
efficiency, by a careful blending and balancing of the considerations of
control and freedom of expression."s Concerns about context and control
lead inevitably to a choice between communication styles-authoritarian or
democratic. Given the educational context, and without discounting control
where control is genuinely needed, educators have chosen the "democratic
109. DELAMONT, supra note 106, at 18.
110. DOUGLAS BARNES, FROM COMMUNICATION TO CURRICULUM 18 (1992); GERALD M. PHILLIPS
ET AL., COMMUNICATION IN EDUCATION 103 (1974). "[A] learning student will want to do something
about what he is learning. He will not want to sit passively and receive information. He will want to
take an active part in acquirng it." Id.
I II. DELAMONT, supra note 106, at 18-19; CAROL EDELSKY ET AL., WHOLE LANGUAGE: WHAT'S
THE DIFFERENCE? 23-26 (1991); GAMMAGE, supra note 108, at 32-38; LINDFORS, supra note 105, at
245-47, 270-71.
112. MEHAN, supra note 60, at 79-80.
113. BARNES, supra note 110, at 31-33; GAMMAGE, supra note 108, at 32-34.
114. BARNES, supra note 110, at 32.
115. For a discussion of the classroom model, see DELAMONT, supra note 106, at 17; GAMMAGE,
supra note 108, at 32-36. For a discussion of the courtroom model, see Friedland, supra note 4, at 206-
09; Strawn & Munsterman, supra note 52, at 447, reprnted in IN THE JURY Box, supra note 52, at 185-
86; Gewen, supra note 59, at 15.
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classroom"' 6 with a few explicit, and many implicit, "speaking rights" for
students. These "rights" are accompanied by "rules for getting the floor.
''17
We need "democratic courtrooms" where jurors enjoy explicit "speaking
rights" regulated by rules and procedures necessary to ensure a fair trial."
8
There are important lessons to be learned from our brothers and sisters whose
lifework has been devoted to improving learning.
D Juror Models Contrasted
Although Table 1 listed the characteristics of the passive juror depicted by
the Legal Model," 9 a comparative summary with the research-based and
classroom-tested profile of the juror presented by the Behavioral-Educational
Model is beneficial. The contrasts are numerous and striking.




3. Empty vessel to be filled
4. Object of one-way, linear
communication
5. Complete and accurate
recorder of information
6. Suspends judgment
until end of case regarding:
a. evaluation of evidence
Behavioral-Educational Model
1. Active-takes responsibil-
ity for one's part in the
learning
2. Actively participates
3. Possesses existing frames
of reference
4. Participant in interactive
process
5. Selective and otherwise
imperfect recall of evidence
6. Actively processes
information as received:
a. evaluates, classifies, etc.,
evidence
116. DELAMONT, supra note 106, at 17; GAMMAGE, supra note 108, at 33-36.
117. COURTNEY B. CAzMEN, CLASSROOM DISCOURSE 54 (1988); MEHAN, supra note 60, at 139-60,
190-98.
118. Professor Friedland put it well: "[T]he responsibility [for deciding the case] should be
complemented by a corollary predicate freedom of the jury to have some input, albeit regulated, into
deciding what information is necessary for the jury to resolve relevant issues." Fnedland, supra note
4, at 209.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 67-77.
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TABLE 2: The Juror Models Compared (cont'd)
b. decision on the issues
7 Does not give feedback
until verdict
8. Because of "recall readi-
ness," substantive jury in-
structions are best given at
end of case
9. Takes into account all
evidence
10. Well-served by adversarial
system
11. Effective representative





7. Continuous feedback during
trial and deliberations
8. "Cognitive filters" used
during trial; instructions
should also come at beginning
of trial
9. Selects evidence that best
fits frame of reference or
tentative verdict choice; forgets
some, confused by other
10. Frustrated and confused by
adversary system, which
interferes with learning
11. Loss of sense of power and
control; reduced satisfaction;
importance of jury denigrated
With this frame of reference in mind, the most commonly suggested devices
for improving jury competence in general, and juror participation in the trial
in particular, are discussed and analyzed below
III. PERMITTING GREATER JUROR PARTICIPATION IN THE TRIAL
This Part is intended as more of a listing and summary of the published
works and suggestions of others than as an analysis. While my own thoughts
are added in some places, the works of others speak for themselves. Time and
space constraints permit only an attempt to collect the very recent work,
conducted mostly by social scientists. Ten techniques or procedures, all of
which are thought to enhance juror participation and comprehension, are
presented in their order of occurrence at trial, not necessarily in the order of
their importance or merit.
A. Case-Specific Juror Orientation
In most jurisdictions, prospective jurors receive an initial orientation in the
jury assembly room by way of a live or recorded presentation or by a written
12471993]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
pamphlet. This is usually all the orientation they receive prior to jury
selection, whether the case is routine or complex.
Many authorities encourage that another, case-specific orientation be given
in many cases, especially complex or lengthy ones, either just before jury
selection or just after. Juror comprehension will be aided as jurors will be
better prepared to understand the evidence.120 Court-appointed experts,
rather than counsel or their experts, should give the jurors some background,
terminology, and foundation for what will come.' 2 ' At this stage, jurors
ought to be encouraged to ask questions.
22
Giving an orientation to the entire panel before jury selection consumes
some additional time, but it could make for a shorter and more meaningful
voir dire, much as mini-opening statements from counsel might.' Whether
given to the whole panel or just to the jurors chosen to hear the case, such a
procedure holds the added advantage of responding to jurors' pre-existing
"frames of reference" or "stories" that they use as cognitive filters while
hearing evidence.
24
B. Mini-Opening Statements Before Voir Dire
Although imminently logical, the technique of having lawyers make brief
statements about their cases to the entire jury panel prior to commencement
of voir dire seems to be used rarely Nor is it often discussed in legal
literature. 25 Such a non-argumentative, informative statement would result
in a better test for dectecting juror bias since the prospective jurors would
know more about the case. Voir dire and the reasons for asking certain
questions would be clearer to more jurors, while the investment of time and
expense by counsel and court would be negligible.
120. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at I01; Austin, supra note 6, at 18; Strawn & Munsterman, supra note
52, at 446-47; James Withrow & David Suggs, Procedures for Improving Jury Trials of Complex
Litigation, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 493, 506-07 (1980).
121. See sources cited supra note 120.
122. Austin, supra note 6, at 15.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
124. See Kassin & Wnghtsman, supra note 87, at 145; Moore, supra note 73, at 278.
125. But see Strawn & Munsterman, supra note 52, at 446-47 (recommending that the court's
preliminary jury instructions also be read in conjunction with the statements of counsel), reprinted in
IN THE JURY Box, supra note 52, at 184.
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C. Preliminary Jury Instructions
In most courtrooms, the pattern or scripted jury instructions given at the
outset of the case deal with very elementary legal principles of general
application and with various procedural or housekeeping matters. Rarely are
they tailored to the individual case. According to social science and legal
literature, failure to give the jury more substantive guidance at this early and
critical juncture of the trial wastes a real opportunity to better inform the jury
and improve the quality of the trial and verdict.
2 6
Studies involving actual jurors, lawyers, and judges strongly endorse case-
specific, substantive preliminary instructions and cite a number of advantages
such instructions provide for jurors.'27 The advantages include the follow-
ing: improving jurors' recall;2 . focusing jurors' attention on the relevant
issues; reducing the chances of jurors applying the wrong rule or standard to
the evidence; 29 reducing the number of questions by jurors during delibera-
tions; 30  creating more informed verdicts;' increasing juror satisfac-
tion; 32 and accommodating jurors' natural tendencies to immediately
process evidence when they receive it by providing relevant law that helps
jurors (1) organize the evidence, (2) assess its significance, and (3) avoid
premature judgments. 33 None of the anticipated or claimed disadvantages
materialized. 34
126. See SYMPOSiUM REPORT, supra note 78, at 23.
127. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 49-52; HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 87, at 122-23; Larry
Heuer & Steve Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with Written and Preliminary
Instructions, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409 (1989); Sand & Reiss, supra note 64, at 438-42. Depending
on the complexity of the legal issues in the case, a pretrial charging conference with the attorneys might
be advisable. Id. at 442.
128. Elwork et al., supra note 87, at 169-71.
129. Amiram Elwork & Bruce Sales, Jury Instructions, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND
TRIAL PROCEDURE 281, 291 (Saul Kassm & Lawrence Wrightsman eds., 1985).
130. Sand & Reiss, supra note 64, at 439-42.
131. N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 553.
132. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 49-52.
133. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 49-52; Elwork et al., supra note 87, at 171-78; N.Y. State Bar
Report, supra note 88, at 553; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 583-84.
134. Anticipated, but unrealized, disadvantages included: given general juror orientation, substantive
preliminary instructions would not be necessary; jurors' demands upon the judge would delay trial;
jurors would be encouraged to view trials from too narrow a perspective; jurors would embark on a
hypothesis-confirming search; jurors would be acquittal prone, A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 49-52;
the procedure might encourage premature decision making; and jurors might oversimplify the issues,
Sand & Reiss, supra note 64, at 438-39.
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Applicable federal rules neither require nor forbid preliminary jury
instructions. 35 State rules of procedure that are modeled after the federal
rules would be of the same effect. However, other state rules might require
something more than pro forma preliminary instructions. 36 Experienced and
respected judges and court critics strongly recommend case-specific,
substantive preliminary jury instructions. 137
For many of the reasons noted below for giving jurors written copies of the
final instructions before they are read by the judge, 3 a copy of the prelimi-
nary instructions should also be given to each juror before these instructions
are read. Jurors should be encouraged to keep the instructions readily
available if they want to consult them during the trial. Jurors should also be
instructed not to let the instructions distract them in any way from what is
happening in the courtroom. Finally, it should be emphasized that the
instructions are only preliminary, and that at the end of the trial the final
instructions and the rules of law to be applied in deciding the case will be
provided to the jurors by the judge.
D Juror Notebooks
Describing jurors' notebooks as aids to recall and comprehension, the
American Bar Association's report, Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases,
recommends the creation and use of multiple-purpose jurors' notebooks, at
least in complex or lengthy trials. 39 The report suggests that the contents
of the notebooks include jurors' notes; a list of witnesses' names, including
descriptions or photos if deemed helpful; copies of key documents; a glossary
of technical terms; and, eventually, a copy of the final jury instructions. 140
A trial judge who has used this practice with success in complex cases
suggests two additional items: a list of the parties and their attorneys; and a
seating chart for the courtroom.' 4 1 Finally, Professor Austin recommends
135. See FED. R. Civ. P 51 and FED. R. CRiM. P. 30; Sand & Reiss, supra note 64, at 438. Federal
appellate courts leave the matter to the discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g., United States v. Ruppel,
666 F.2d 261, 274 (5th Cir. 1982).
136. See, e.g., ARiz. R. CRiM. P 18.6(c) ("Immediately after the jury is sworn, the court shall instruct
the jury concerning its duties, its conduct, the order of proceedings, and the elementary legal principles
that will govern the proceeding.").
137. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 150 (1949); Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 129-31; Prettyman,
supra note 87, at 1066.
138. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
139. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 34-37.
140. Id. at 34-37, 49.
141. John V Singleton, Jury Trial: History and Preservation, 32 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 273, 279
(1988).
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that, after debriefing jurors following a long and complex trial, each juror be
supplied with an "on-going index containing brief descriptions of the
exhibits." 42 This is intended for the jurors' notebooks as well.
E. Note-Taking by Jurors
Everyone else in the courtroom is allowed to make and keep notes-why
not jurors? The irony represented by such a situation is probably lost on legal
traditionalists, but it is not lost on social scientists and educators who have
studied the effects of the practice. 43 Though gaining in popularity and use,
there is still substantial resistance, notably at the federal level, to permitting
jurors to take notes. 44
Citing several obvious advantages, 41 recent studies endorse note-taking
as an important aid to the jury 146 Surveys reveal that most jurors, judges,
and lawyers favor juror note-taking. 47 The research and plain logic of it
142. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 100 (citation omitted).
143. E.g., KAsSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 129.
There is an element of arrogance and hypocrisy to the notion that jurors would be so
adversely affected by taking notes. As Judge Urbom noted, "If there are reasons for note-
taking by lawyers and judges during a trial, there are at least the same reasons for note-
taking by jurors." The reasons, we think, are self-evident to all of us who kept notebooks
in school.
Id., see also Victor E. Flango, Would Jurors Do a Better Job if They Could Take Notes?, 63
JUDICATURE 436, 439 (1980).
144. KAssiN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 128 (stating that 90% of federal trial judges are
thought to prohibit the practice); see also MOORE, supra note 37, at 177 (concluding that note-taking
byjurors is too distracting, but citing no data); Prentice H. Marshall, A View From the Bench: Practical
Perspectives on Juries, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 153 (doubting jurors' abilities to take notes and fearing
that those who can might dominate others); see R.M. Weddle, Annotation, Taking and Use of Trial
Notes by Jury, 14 A.L.R.31t 831 (1967) (citing numerous state cases that approve of juror note-taking).
145. The advantages found include the following: engagement of the jurors in the trial; increased
attention ofjurors; better ability ofjurors to refresh memories later in the trial or during deliberations,
KASsiN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra 4ote 5, at 129; Sand & Reiss, supra note 64, at 447; Austin, supra note
6, at 18; a reduction in jurors' requests for court reporter readbacks, Sand & Reiss, supra note 64, at
450; Austin, supra note 6, at 18; and increased morale and satisfaction of jurors, see A.B.A. REPORT,
supra note 5, at 34-35. Supposed disadvantages have been addressed in studies and found to be minimal
or non-existent. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 128-29; HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 87,
at 123; A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 35; AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y, supra note 5, at 13-14.
146. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 34-37; KASsiN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 436-39.
147. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 85 at 244-51; Sand & Reiss, supra note 64, at 448-49 (reporting
majority of defense counsel, civil and criminal, were not in favor of the practice); see also GUINTHER,
supra note 5, at 295 (finding that 54% of jurors in a study who did not take notes during trial said that
they would have liked to have done so). Relying on his own survey, among others, one trial judge
adopted the practice, concluding that the quality of deliberations would be enhanced. See Yeager v.
Green, 502 A.2d 980, 987-92 (D.C. Cir. 1985). It has been reported that some jurors, frustrated at not
being able to take notes, do so anyway so they will not forget certain testimony. Austin, supra note 6,
at 18; see also SYMPosiuM REPORT, supra note 78, at 18 (referring to note-taking as "[p]erhaps the most
widely suggested reform for enhancing juror comprehension").
19931
1NDIANA LAW JOURNAL
appear to have convinced nearly all of the legal commentators who have
recently published on the subject. 4 ' If all of this is not sufficient to
convince hold-out judges and resistant litigators, nothing except a rule
granting jurors the right to take notes will change their traditional, legal-
cultural attitudes quickly and efficiently 141
An explanatory and cautionary instruction would appear appropriate in
facilitating note-taking. At the outset, jurors should be told, among other
things, that those wishing to take notes may do so, but that no juror is
required to take notes; that note-taking should not distract them from the court
proceedings, such as watching witnesses testify; and that, in cases of conflict,
their notes should not take the place of their independent memories.
F Document Control
The American Bar Association, in its 1989 report, Jury Comprehension in
Complex Cases, found that the third most significant source of jury confusion
and frustration centered on the many exhibits at trial. Specifically, many
interviewed jurors complained about the sheer volume of documents. The
jurors felt that many of the documents were not necessary, that the jury was
not adequately informed concerning which documents were important and
why, and that the jury had substantial difficulties finding particular exhibits
during deliberations. 5 0 Other researchers have discovered much the same,
leading one to conclude that "[w]hile document control is primarily a
management burden for court and counsel, it is also a significant source of
static in [juror] comprehension."'i'
Authorities also agree on the minimum elements of an effective document
control program for the trial of cases involving a large number of documents:
(1) the judge should direct counsel to minimize documentary evidence and,
if necessary, meet with them prior to trial to ensure the direction is honored;
148. See, e.g., N. Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 558-60; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 138-39;
Austin, supra note 6, at 18; John V Singleton & Miriam Kass, Helping the Jury Understand Complex
Cases, LITIGATION, Spring 1986, at 11-12.
149. For example, Arizona has a rule allowing the practice in all criminal trials in the state:
Note Taking. The court shall instruct the jurors that they may take notes regarding the
evidence presented and keep the notes for the purpose of refreshing their memory when
they retire for deliberation. The court shall provide materials suitable for this purpose.
After the jury has rendered its verdict, the notes shall be collected by the bailiff or clerk
who shall destroy them promptly.
ARiz. R. CRiM. P 18.6(d). The state's rules of civil procedure are modeled after the federal rules and
do not refer to note-taking. Despite this omission, the practice is commonplace in civil trials in Arizona.
150. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 29-31.
151. AusTriN, supra note 4, at 100.
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(2) at trial, counsel should be encouraged and, if necessary, ordered to
distinguish critical documents for the jury; (3) each juror should have, as part
of the juror's notebook, a periodically updated index to all exhibits containing
brief descriptions of each; and (4) jurors should be presented with a simple
system for retrieval of exhibits during deliberations.'52
G. Questioning of Witnesses By Jurors
Of the ten procedures discussed in this section, one-that jurors be
permitted to ask questions of witnesses through the judge-seems to have
generated the most controversy A number of reasons probably account for
this, but the fundamental reason, in my view, is that the suggestion goes to
a core concern of the advocate-maintaining control over the case-and of the
judge-keeping control over the trial. These concerns generate opposition by
the legal fraternity, notwithstanding demonstrated benefits and available
safeguards to ensure an orderly trial.
Studies verify that the advantages to jurors and the trial as a whole
outweigh the feared risks, and that questioning by jurors is an important
device for permitting more (and much needed) juror participation in the fact-
finding process.' The demonstrated advantages include: giving jurors a
greater sense of active participation in the search for truth;. 4 providing an
opportunity to clarify an important matter and to end or avoid confusion;
5
allowing jurors to pursue relevant information not solicited by the law-
yers; 5 6 keeping juror attention better focused; 5 7 involving jurors in the
process so that they remain more alert; 5 1 and revealing a juror's mistaken
notion of fact or law, 5 9 or even juror misconduct.' 60
Legal authorities, including many trial judges,' are very supportive of
the procedure. 62 It goes without saying that the idea enjoys strong support
152. See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 29-31; see also supra'text accompanying note 150.
153. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOc'Y, supra note 5; AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 102-03; KASSrN &
WRiGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 129-3 1; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 85, at 251-57; Sand & Reiss, supra
note 64, at 443-44.
154. KAssIN & WRIGHThMAN, supra note 5, at 130; Sand & Reiss, supra note 64, at 444.
155. KASsIN & WRIGHTMAN, supra note 5, at 130.
156. Id.
157. Sand & Reiss, supra note 64, at 444.
158. Id.
159. Harms, supra note 22, at 130-31.
160. See Riessen v. Neville, 425 N.W.2d 665, 668-69 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
161. E.g., Frankel, supra note 6; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 139-42.
162. SYMPOSIUM REPORT, supra note 78, at 20; Strawn & Munsterman, supra note 52, at 447,
reprnted in IN THE JURY Box, supra note 52, at 184-85; Harms, supra note 22; Michael A.
McLaughlin, Note, Questions to Witnesses and Notetaking by the Jury as Aids in Understanding
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among jurors, especially those who have experienced it. 6 3 It has also caught
the attention of the popular press."6 Indeed, while no court rules have been
found that forbid, authorize, or regulate the procedure, none may be
necessary Some support may be found in Rule 611(a) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 165 which charges the judge with the responsibility of control-
ling the questioning of witnesses so that, among other things, the interrogation
is "effective for the ascertainment of the truth."
Safeguards are necessary, of course, and readily available.' 66 In order to
implement appropriate procedural safeguards, steps that have been proposed
or that otherwise come to mind may include: (1) requiring jurors' questions
to be in writing and unsigned;'67 (2) requiring jurors' questions to be
brought to the judge, who, out of the jury's presence, discusses them with the
attorneys to determine if there are objections; (3) assuming the questions are
Complex Litigation, 18 NEW ENG. L. REv. 687 (1983); Michael Wolff, Comment, Juror Questions: A
Survey of Theory and Use, 55 Mo. L. REv. 817 (1990); see also N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88,
at 558, 560-61 (stating that "neither reason nor experience requires" that jurors not be able to ask
questions); Robin C. Lamer, Annotation, Jurors Questioning Witnesses in Federal Court, 80 A.L.R.
FED. 892 (1986); Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Propriety of Jurors Asking Questions in Open Court
During Course of Trial, 31 A.L.R.3d 872 (1970).
163. GUINTHER, supra note 5, at 68 (finding that 80% of the jurors polled wished they had been
allowed to ask questions); The View from the Jury Box, supra note 64, at S15 (noting that almost one-
half of the jurors surveyed favored asking questions).
164. Lis Wiehl, After 200 Years, the Silent Juror Learns to Talk, N.Y. TiMEs, July 7, 1989, at B5.
("[T]he experiment is the latest milestone in a decade-long liberalization of the roles ofjudge and jury
") "[J]uror's questions chip away at the trial lawyer's domination of courtroom interrogation." Id.
(quoting David Wilkins, assistant professor at Harvard Law School).
165. I argue that since the trial judge has the responsibility for assuring that the trial is a truth-
seeking process, and since the judge is in control of the trial, it cannot be an abuse of discretion to
permit the persons that must find the facts to themselves ask questions in a structured and controlled
way. See DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 515 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that
Rule 611 (a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides "guidance" on the question); Lamer, supra note
162, at 893 (stating that Rule 611 (a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is "relevant" in deciding whether
juror questions are appropriate).
166. See State v. LeMaster, 669 P.2d 592, 597-98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (providing appellate
guidelines for juror questioning); AMERICAN JUDICAURE SOC'Y, supra note 5; Ellyn C. Acker,
Comment, Standardized Procedures for Juror Interrogation of Witnesses, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 557,
572-73 (proposing model rules for inclusion in the Federal Rules ofEvidence). Acker's suggested model
rules call for an attorney's objection to a juror's question to be made within the juror's hearing. No
other proposal on this matter agrees. Opportunity to object outside the presence of the jury ought to be
provided.
In Mancopa County, Arizona, where I sit as a trial judge, the prosecutor's office has prepared for
filing in selected cases a form motion seeking an order allowing jurors to ask questions in accordance
with the procedure outlined in LeMaster A proposed jury instruction informing the jurors of this right
and of the procedures to be followed accompanies the motion. My two years' experience with the
procedure suggests that prosecutors are more likely than defense counsel to favor juror questioning.
167. For a report on experience with oral juror questions, see Georgia Sargeant, Juror Questions
During Trial? The Verdict Isn't in, TRIAL, Sept. 1989, at 14.
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proper, allowing the judge, not the attorneys, to put the questions to the
witness; and (4) informing the jurors that they should not attach any
significance to the failure of the judge to ask a requested question since rules
of law may prevent some questions from being asked.
H. Interim Summaries
The idea of permitting or directing counsel to sum up after discrete
segments in a long or complex case has been analogized to a professor giving
a review lecture during a course,168 and to a motorist's need to consult a
highway map a number of times on a long trip before reaching the destina-
tion. 169 Analogies aside, experts who have studied the technique,17 0 and
judges who have used it,' 7' are unanimous in their views that in many cases
the procedure boosts juror comprehension. The several advantages found to
result include: enhancing juror understanding of the evidence; 72 assisting
jurors in recalling the evidence; 73 allowing counsel to organize, clarify,
emphasize, contextualize, and explain evidence;' 74 and aiding jurors in
remaining focused, which prevents jurors from making premature judgments
based on only a part of the case.1
71
The procedure lends itself to flexibility In one lengthy, complex, and highly
publicized trial, each side was allotted two hours for interim summaries
between opening statements and closing arguments, to use as they saw fit. The
longest summation lasted only ten minutes, the shortest about eighty
seconds. 76 Another approach is to allocate a few minutes after pre-
designated segments or days of trial. Obviously, a hybrid of these two formats
could be utilized. Despite possible pitfalls, 77 the use of an interim summary
168. Austin, supra note 6, at 18.
"169. Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 144.
170. E.g., N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 555-58; Austin, supra note 6, at 18; see also
A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 25-33 (discussing the impact of the quantity of evidence and the length
of the trial on juror comprehension).
171. E.g., Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Complex Case: Observations About the Current
Debate, in THE AMERICAN CIVIL JURY 69, 78 (The Roscoe Pound Foundation 1987); Schwarzer, supra
note I, at 144-45.
172. N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 557.
173. See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 34-37; N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 557.
174. See N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 557-58.
175. See KAssIN & WRIGHTMAN, supra note 5, at 136-37; MY. State Bar Report, supra note 88,
at 558.
176. N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 557.
177. Such pitfalls include jurors focusing on what counsel say the case is about, rather than on what
is actually shown by the evidence; jurors feeling that they do not have to concentrate on the testimony




in appropriate cases is highly beneficial because it "divides the task of




Complaints about jurors' difficulties in understanding and following the
judge's final legal instructions have been around for some time, 79 and they
still persist. Now, however, critics have the force of empircal research on
their side, as numerous recent studies demonstrate what most of us intu-
it-that jurors too frequently fail to understand the instructions. 80 Indeed,
the findings are said to confirm "a persistent failure to communicate,"8 '
resulting in "clear evidence" of confusion.8 2 Among the major recent
findings are the following: (1) jurors frequently find instructions unclear due
to their technical nature, their use of legal terms, and their lack of organiza-
tion; 3 (2) the timing is poor since jurors hear most of the instructions for
the first time at the end of the case;'84 (3) the absence of written copies for
each juror contributes to confusion and poor recall;8 5 and (4) juror confu-
sion is exacerbated when the judge fails to provide helpful responses to
jurors' questions about instructions during deliberations. 86
178. Higginbotham, supra, note 171, at 78.
179. See FRANK, supra note 137, at 111-14.
180. Alan Reifinan et al., Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 539, 547, 556 (1992) (reporting survey of former jurors that revealed that they understood
instructions on substantive law less than one-half of the time); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 87, at 120-
22; A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 43-52; Severance & Loftus, supra note 64 (presenting the results
of three studies on juror comprehension of instructions); Steele & Thornburg, supra note 58, at 251;
Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 42, at 480-82.
181. Steele & Thornburg, supra note 58, at 249.
182. Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 42, at 483; see also Cecil et al., supra note 4, at 749 ("Indeed,
if the jury has an Achilles heel, it is the comprehension of legal instructions.").
183. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 43-52; see also KASSiN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 147
(discussing lawyers' and judges' views on how instructions should be worded and whether juries
actually pay attention to them).
184. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 49-51, 622-24; see also KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note
5, at 144-46 (discussing the timing of procedural instructions and substantive instructions, arguing that
some substantive instructions should be given early in the process). For a discussion of the issues
concerning the timing of final instructions, see infra text accompanying notes 196-202. For the
importance of substantive preliminary jury instructions, see supra notes 126-38 and accompanying text.
185. See infra text accompanying notes 202-07.
186. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 52-53; see also Severance & Loflus, supra note 64, at 172-73.
For a discussion of how judges respond to such questions, see infra text accompanying notes 212-20.
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Psychologists say that these and other juror complaints are no surprise given
the "eccentricities of the instruction ritual."'8 7 "The courts want juries to
comply with their judges' instructions. With that reasonable assumption as a
point of departure, we ask: so why do they cling to psychologically unsound
methods of communication?" '1 8
2. Content and Style
The high rate of failure of jurors to fully understand the content of legal
instructions is especially well-documented. 8 9 Given this abundance of
research data, some experts decry the lack of movement toward more
comprehensible instructions. 90 Students of communication science and other
experts agree on the general goals for reform. First, with the juror in mind,
instructions must be drafted as simply and clearly as the message content
permits.' 9 ' Second, instructions should be as case-specific as possible, using
parties' names, actual fact issues, and examples from the case.i92 Third, the
volume of instructions should be reduced to the absolute minimum. 93
Finally, the trial judge ought to be making some general suggestions to the
jurors regarding deliberations and the group decision-making process.'"
187. KAssIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 144.
188. Id.
189. The major studies are listed in Steele & Thornburg, supra note 58, at 250 nn.10-17; see also
A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 43-49. But see The View from the Jury Box, supra note 64, at S15
(reporting that 86% of jurors found the instructions given by the judge easy to understand).
190. See, e.g., Steele & Thomburg, supra note 58, at 251-53; Tanford, supra note 2, at 166. While
acknowledging that the issue of juror comprehension "is not closely tied to the interests [of] the legal
profession," it has been observed that lawyers and judges might be moved to action at a faster pace if
low comprehension of jury instructions were made a ground of appeal. Anramm Elwork et al., Toward
Understandable Jury Instructions, in IN THE JURY Box, supra note 52, at 161, 176; see also SYMPOSIUM
REPORT, supra note 78, at 24 (urging appellate court tolerance of nonpattem instructions); Mitchell v.
Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991) (relying on social science research, pattern jury instruction on
proximate cause rejected as unintelligible to average juror).
191. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 43-49; Schwarzer, supra note 24, at 743-47; Lisa Eichom,
Note, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard Evidence, 52 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 341 (1989) (stating that clearly worded instructions-containing some policy grounds for
excluding evidence-would helpjurors disregard the excluded matenal). Social scientists can contribute
to the improvement of jury comprehension of instructions with specific suggestions for improvement.
See, e.g., Allan Lind & Anthony Partridge, Suggestions for Improving Juror Understanding of
Instructions, in PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS app. A (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1988).
192. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 47-48; Schwarzer, supra note 24, at 744-47.
193. Schwarzer, supra note 24, at 747-55. The final instructions in the Rodney King state court trial
consumed 78 pages of mind-numbing legalese. People v. Powell, No. BA-035498 (Super. Ct. Los
Angeles County, Cal. 1992).
194. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 72, at 230; KAssiN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 143; Strawn
& Munsterman, supra note 52, at 445-46, reprinted in IN THE JURY Box, supra note 52, at 183.
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It is quite common for joint bench-bar committees to suggest new
instructions and to revise existing ones as needed. Research results strongly
suggest that such committees be expanded to include or use the services of
appropriate social science representatives-for example, experts in communi-
cations, psychology, and psycholinguistics, and lay persons, including former
jurors.'9 5
3. The Timing of Final Instructions
By tradition or rule, final instructions almost always follow closing
arguments of counsel. We are being encouraged to reconsider that ritual, and
for good reason. Researchers, commentators, and judges alike contend that
jury comprehension is increased if the order of these important events is
reversed so that instructions precede the arguments of counsel.196 Reversing
the normal order of closing arguments and final instructions helps jurors
integrate the evidence and the law, 9 7 enables jurors to better evaluate the
arguments of counsel, 198 and makes it unnecessary for counsel to appear to
"predict" for the jury how the judge will instruct, which allows counsel to
integrate more smoothly into their arguments the actual instructions already
heard by the jury 199
While a change in sequence might be prohibited by rule in some states,
federal rules expressly permit the judge to instruct before argument. 200 Even
where a rule declares a preference for instructing the jury following closing
arguments, the sequence of events can frequently be altered either by
stipulation of counsel or by order of the judge.2 °I
Given my experience with instructing before argument, in both criminal and
civil cases, counsel are usually skeptical, if not outright resistant, to a change
in sequence. However, almost all report satisfaction following trial. A concern
unique to defense counsel is that the prosecutor or plaintiff's attorney will be
the last person the jury hears. I inform them this will not be so, as it is not,
195. Steele & Thornburg, supra note 58, at 254; Austin, supra note 6, at 18. Prepared with the aid
of an expert in communications, examples of comprehensible instructions readily adaptable to specific
fact patterns are found in the Iowa Civil and Criminal Jury Instructions (1988). See IOWA STATE BAR
ASS'N, IOWA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTiONS (1988); IOWA STATE BAR ASS'N, IOWA CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUcTIONs (1988).
196. N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 563; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 131-32; Schwarzer,
supra note 24, at 755-56; Singleton & Kass, supra note 148, at 59.
197. N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 563.
198. Singleton & Kass, supra note 148, at 59.
199. N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 563.
200. See FED. R. Civ. P 51; FED. R. CRIM. P 30.
201. See, e.g., ARiz. R. CRIM. P 19.1(a).
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since the judge usually takes the jury back after argument for important
"housekeeping" matters, such as selection and excusal of alternate jurors,
discussion of the anticipated schedule for deliberations and meals, and
reminders regarding exhibits and what jurors may take into the jury room.
Concerned counsel seem to forget that the judge always gets the last word!
4. Written Copy of Final Instructions for Each Juror
To suggest, as many do, that copies of the final instructions be given to
each juror, just as they are given to counsel, does not seem radical on its face.
Nor are there many reversals on appeal for furnishing copies of instructions
to jurors-a practice that would allow jurors to follow along as the instruc-
tions are read and then take them into deliberations.2"2 Still, courts have
been slow to adopt the practice.
The absence of a rush of judges and bar groups to embrace this seemingly
innocent, yet beneficial, measure cannot be explained away due to the lack of
encouragement. Two of the largest bar organizations in the country have
recently recommended the practice.2 3 Not surprisingly, three different
studies of this practice, all of which included surveys of judges, lawyers, and
jurors, reported at least four distinct advantages to the practice of furnishing
written copies to jurors: (1) jurors experienced less confusion about the
charge; 204 (2) jurors reported that deliberations were aided because of copied
instructions; 20 1 (3) jurors had fewer questions about the instructions during
deliberations; 20 6 and (4) jurors exhibited more confidence in their ver-
dict.20 7 All anyone in the legal profession has to do is to try it once and ask
the jurors following the verdict if the procedure was helpful to them.
202. See Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Sending Written Instructions with Retiring
Jury in Civil Case, 91 A.L.R.3d 336 (1979); Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Sending
Written Instructions with Retiring Jury in Criminal Case, 91 A.L.R.3d 382 (1979).
A less attractive alternative would be to tape-record the reading of the instructions and send the tape
and a tape player into the jury room for the jurors' use. While an audio playback would assist all jurors
to some extent, especially those who might have difficulty reading the written text, this procedure poses
obvious practical problems compared to each juror having his or her own copy. Moreover, the logistical
problems previously associated with providing written copies to all jurors have greatly diminished thanks
to the widespread use of word processors and high speed copiers.
203. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 51-52, 622-26; N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 564;
see also SYMPOSIUM REPORT, supra note 78, at 24.
204. N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 565; Sand & Reiss, supra note 64, at 455-56.
205. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 51-52, 622-26.
206. N.Y. State Bar Report, supra note 88, at 565; Sand & Reiss, supra note 64, at 453-56.
207. See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 4349.
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5. Inviting Questions By Jurors
Given the proven high rate of juror confusion regarding legal instruc-
tions,2"' and given that a large percentage of questions from deliberating
jurors deal with the law,209 one has to wonder why judges do not routinely
ask jurors, immediately after reading the instructions, if anyone is confused
by, or has any questions about, the instructions? Is not that the best time to
answer questions and clear up any confusion that may have already manifested
itself? Would not that help ensure that the jurors understand the charge and
aid those who do not?
Perhaps the fear of questions being asked (and spontaneously answered by
judges) at this juncture is unsettling to some. It need not be, nor does the
judge have to answer immediately A recess can be called, if necessary, to
talk with the attorneys and to frame an answer. Furthermore, the fear of being
reversed on appeal should not deter judges from responding to jurors'
questions about the instructions. Surely, trial judges are up to the task.
Besides, the benefits, real and potential, appear to outweigh the risks. 210
J. Questions and Requests from Deliberating Jurors
The failure of trial judges to be of greater assistance to jurors regarding
questions during deliberations has been shown to be an additional major
source of juror confusion.2 ' One interesting study examined all of the trials
handled by nineteen judges in an urban county over a period of one year.2
Of the 405 total trials, ninety-nine deliberating juries, or about twenty-five
percent, submitted written questions.1 The researchers found that "with
unexpected homogeneity (seventy percent of the time), the judges answered
questions that sought clarification of instructions by simply referring the jury
208. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
209. See Severance & Loftus, supra note 64, at 166-70 (finding that almost 75% of the questions
sent out by surveyed juries dealt with the instructions).
210. See Strawn & Munsterman, supra note 52, at 447, reprinted in IN THE JURY Box, supra note
52, at 184-85.
211. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 52-53; Forston, supra note 70, at 628-29; Severance & Loftus,
supra note 64, at 172-73; see also Vincent J. O'Neill, Famous Last Words: Responding to Requests and
Questions of Deliberating Jurors in Criminal Cases, II CRIM. JUs. J. 381 (1989). A principle reason
for judges' reticence is fear of committing reversible error at such a sensitive stage of the trial.
Severance & Loftus, supra note 64, at 163. Instructing juries at an impasse or at a deadlock due to
division is beyond the scope of this section. However, for suggestions concerning dialogue with juries
in similar straits, see infra notes 255-73 and accompanying text.
212. Severance & Loftus, supra note 64, at 164-65.
213. Id. at 165.
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to the instructions without further comment." 4 Questions regarding
evidence were similarly dispatched, the jurors being told eleven of twelve
times to rely upon their memories of the evidence.21 ' With admirable
restraint, the researchers wondered if there was sufficient judicial "concern
and responsiveness" to juror confusion," 6 and concluded that judges "may
wish to evaluate their own responses to jury questions in light of these
data.121 7 Although these rather disturbing results vary from time to time
within the same courthouse or from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the results
strongly suggest a pervasive problem, especially in light of the related
findings that suggest that a lack of judicial responsiveness is a major source
of juror confusion.218
Case law allows trial judges discretion to decide how to respond to
questions from a deliberating jury,219 except where failure to respond, or to
do so adequately, bears on an important matter and may prompt an erroneous
verdict." ° Jurors' questions, looked on by many lawyers and judges as an
inconvenience or worse, should be viewed as welcomed opportunities to learn
about jurors' thinking' and to determine whether additional or corrective
action is necessary to ensure juror comprehension.2 22 If judges more fully
and fairly respond to deliberating jurors' legitimate concerns in a manner
consistent with applicable law, being careful, obviously, not to state or imply
any view on the merits or to pressure the jury in any way, these occasions for
dialogue will help combat juror confusion and mistaken verdicts.
IV. JUROR "SPEAKING RIGHTS"
BEYOND NOTE-TAKING AND ASKING QUESTIONS
The ten procedures or techniques discussed in Part III have received
considerable attention from social scientists, legal commentators, judges, bar
214. Id. at 172.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 173; see also A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 5, at 52-53; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 143.
218. See sources cited supra note 211.
219. E.g., Lundquist v. Seales, 657 P.2d 912, 914-15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Waterford v. Halloway,
491 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 (Il1. Ct. App. 1986).
220. E.g., Bollenback v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946); Harrington v. Beauchamp Enter., 761
P.2d 1022, 1025 (Ariz. 1988).
221. See Bernard S. Meyer & Maurice Rosenberg, Questions Juries Ask- Untapped Springs of
Insight, 55 JUDICATURE 105 (1971) (explaining a system of monitoring jury deliberations through jury
questions in order to better understand how civil juries bring community standards to bear in deciding
the legal issues presented to them).
222. See Severence & Loftus, supra note 64, at 163.
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groups, and others. Although some of these suggestions still generate debate
in various quarters, none of them can be considered radical or revolutionary.
Rather, one might characterize them as "mainstream" proposals that have been
or ought to be implemented on a relatively broad scale in the near future.
Momentum appears to be on their side.
Two additional proposals may further advance juror participation and two-
way communication. Hopefully, these ideas will receive added attention and
consideration in social science and legal circles and will be tested in
courtrooms, jury rooms, and elsewhere, generating sufficient empirical data
to support informed judgments. The first additional proposal-that of
permitting jurors to discuss the evidence among themselves as the trial
proceeds-has received only modest attention in recent years. It has yet to
pass beyond the preliminary discussion stage to serious debate and field
testing. In the interest of juror comprehension and a more democratic
courtroom, it is time that it did.
The second proposal, no mention of which can be found in legal or social
science literature or in published cases, is intended to provide a vehicle for
judicial and attorney interaction with deliberating jurors who indicate they
have reached an impasse or are having difficulties in reaching a verdict. In
brief, the trial judge would offer the help of court and counsel by asking the
jurors to identify and list the issues of fact or.law that divide them, and that,
if addressed further, might help bring about a verdict. This proposal may be
viewed by many, especially some legal traditionalists, as too radical and not
worthy of serious consideration. My objective is to show that it is worthy of
additional study and field testing.
A. Discussions Among Jurors During Trial
1. The Traditional Rule Against Discussions
Among Jurors "Defies Reason
223
The traditional instruction forbidding any and all discussions about the case
by jurors until deliberations commence is a corollary of two assumptions or
expectations: jurors' minds might become contaminated with outside
information and jurors' discussions of the evidence might cause them to make
premature judgments about the case.224
223. Schwarzer, supra note i, at 142.
224. Id., see also SYMPOSIUM REPORT, supra note 78, at 20.
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Consistent with the "passive juror" model, jurors are expected to correctly
encode and store evidence, suspending all judgment in the case until
deliberations commence.22 However much we idealize the average juror in
these ways, the underlying behavioral assumptions have been proven
unwarranted and not based on reality Repeated studies over the past several
years reveal that the juror is not a passive and altogether accurate encoder of
information who suspends judgment until the end of the case.226 One
psychologist and student of juror behavior asks whether humans are even
capable of "detached information processing"-separating the acquisition of
information from its evaluation.227 In two surveys that asked jurors whether
they thought their fellow jurors had discussed the case prior to deliberation,
eleven percent of the jurors responded affirmatively to one survey,228 and
forty-four percent to the other.229 Given that the jurors were admonished not
225. Wrightsman, supra note 74, at 288-89; see also supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., HOROWiTz & WILLGING, supra note 72, at 209-10; WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 74, at
288-89. As concluded in HASTIE ET AL., supra note 72, at 24:
Virtually all models ofjury decision making assume that individual jurors have reached initial
predeliberation verdict decisions at the start of deliberation. Thus, the input at the beginning
of the jury task is a set of jurors with verdict preferences. Each juror may be presumed to have
completed all of the preliminary information-processing subtasks identified in the analysis of
the juror's task before beginning the jury decision task.
See also Forston, supra note 70, at 612 (noting that the "vast majority" ofjurors reach a fairly definite
decision before all the evidence is in); Holstein, supra note 90 (stating that jurors use schema in
interpreting evidence and deciding upon a verdict); MacCoun, supra note 91, at 225 (noting that "many"
jurors form tentative verdict preferences during the trial); Moore, supra note 73, at 274 (finding that
"jurors tended to reach a predeliberation verdict decision by focussing on only one or a very few items
of evidence" in a mock trial experiment); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Practical Implications of
Psychological Research on Juror and Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
90, 93-98 (1990); Thomas L. Gnsham & Stephen F. Lawless, Note, Jurors Judge Justice: A Survey of
Criminal Jurors, 3 N.M. L. REV. 352, 358 (1973) (finding that approximately 57% ofjurors in a study
made up their minds before the deliberations commenced).
227. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 74, at 256. One side effect of forcing silence upon trial jurors was
recently reported. Having no one to talk with about the high-profile case being tried, one juror went
home each evening, soaked in a hot bath, and dictated her impressions of the trial. She later offered to
sell her tapes for $25,000. Joseph Pereira, After Curtain Falls on Celebrated Trials, Limelight Shines
on Vote-and-Tell Jurors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1991, at BI. While this juror merely wanted to get her
thoughts of the trial "off her chest," id. at B5, University of Michigan law professor Richard Lampert
suggests that the potential for such lucrative deals may encourage ajuror to render a decision based less
on the evidence in the case than on "what he or she thinks might make for a more dramatic outcome."
Id.
228. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Douglas Leber, Do Jurors Talk?, TRIAL, Jan. 1986, at 59, 60. This
finding prompted the authors to conclude that a stronger admonition, accompanied by follow-up
interrogations of the jury by the judge, were needed. Id. This sentiment appears to be at odds with the
views of most who have published on this question. See, e.g., AusTiN, supra note 4, at 103-04; Austin,
supra note 6, at 18; Friedland, supra note 4, at 199, 208-09; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 142-43.
229. See Gnsham & Lawless, supra note 226, at 358. This same survey revealed that nearly 19%
of the jurors had made up their minds about guilt or innocence during the evidence phase. See id., see
also The Viewfrom the Jury Box, supra note 64, at S2, SI I (finding that, out of 783 responding jurors,
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to discuss such matters prior to deliberation, one might assume that these
results are conservative.
The researchers who have called for the modification or outright abolition
of the standard proscription cite a number of expected benefits from structured
juror discussions:230 (1) juror understanding of the evidence will be en-
hanced, given the proven benefits of interactive communication and the
collective knowledge of the group;231 (2) thoughts or questions that jurors
have can be shared or asked on a relatively timely basis, but might be
forgotten if held until deliberations; 32 (3) since many jurors form tentative
verdict choices during the evidence phase, these views or biases might surface
during discussions and be tested by the group's knowledge; 23  (4) "fugitive"
conversations are likely to occur anyway-these are divisive and do not have
the benefit of group response;234 and (5) since jurors are going to talk about
something, they might as well talk about matters that are relevant to their
assigned task.235
Having proved the law's assumptions about juror behavior false and having
cast considerable doubt on the wisdom and enforceability of this standard
admonition to jurors, an important task remains for social scientists. Future
research should be conducted to demonstrate the effects of an "affirmative"
instruction permitting jurors, under certain restrictions, to discuss evidence
during the trial.236 Among the concerns raised by the practice are whether
such discussions can occur without jurors taking firm, closed-minded positions
on the ultimate issue or issues in the case and whether the procedure
jeopardizes the fairness of the trial in some other significant way It is time
to learn the answers to these and other pertinent questions.237
71% admitted that they began to decide the case prior to deliberations, and 43% began deciding before
closing arguments).
230. E.g., AUsTIN, supra note 4, at 103-04. "The restriction on intragroup discussion should be
terminated so that jurors can discuss the details of the trial as it unfolds. Group discussion is a logical
adjunct to note-taking and two-way communication." Id. at 103; see also Austin, supra note 6, at 18
(arguing that "group discussion would enhance the collective knowledge of the jury while reinforcing
memory retention").





236. See infra text accompanying notes 252-55. For a proposed jury instruction to that effect, see
infra text accompanying note 256.
237. See generally Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Some Suggestions for the Critical Appraisal
of a More Active Jury, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1990) (calling for more vigorous experimentation with
such progressive jury procedures as note-taking and the questioning of witnesses).
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2. Legal Support for Juror "Speaking Rights"23
The "rules for getting the floor" 9 during trial ought to be modified to
permit at least limited discussions of the evidence among jurors who wish to
participate, thereby establishing a form of "speaking rights" 240 for the
decision makers. Persuaded by studies of group psychology and their own
experiences, legal commentators argue that the restriction on predeliberation
discussions is anti-educational, nondemocratic, and unnecessary to ensure, at
least in its present form, an orderly or otherwise fair trial. 24' For example,
William Schwarzer, Director of the Federal Judicial Center,242 opines that
in long or complex trials, "it defies reason to expect jurors, who may be
confused, troubled, and perhaps overwhelmed by the unaccustomed responsi-
bility, not to share their concerns and look to their colleagues for help and
mutual support. '243 Citing numerous benefits to be gained from freeing
jurors from this overly broad restriction,2" Judge Schwarzer asks, and then
answers, the critical question:
Again, is it better to turn away from the truth or to face it? At the cost of
tolerating a slight departure from the conventional deliberation process, we
238. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. E.g., AUsTIN, supra note 4, at 103-04; Fnedland, supra note 4, at 199, 208-09; Schwarzer,
supra note 1, at 142-43; Austin, supra note 6, at 18.
242. Schwarzer sat on the United States District Court for the Northern District of California from
1976 to 1990. His insights and progressive proposals to improve jury comprehension are heavily relied
upon by this writer and are cited throughout this Article.
243. Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 142.
244. Schwarzer notes:
Discussion among jurors may reveal areas of misunderstanding or confusion that
jurors could then clarify by questioning the witnesses or the judge. It may also help ease
the tension that jurors experience sitting on a long and complicated case. That such
discussions may influence the views of some jurors before the trial is over is not
objectionable, since any tentative opinion so formed must still stand the test of full debate
among the entire jury during the deliberations. In any event, the lonely juror who, unable
to talk to the others, remains confused during the trial is not likely to be an effective
participant in the verdict deliberations.
Permitting jurors to talk to each other about the case during the trial may have other
positive effects. There is evidence that the opinions jurors form early in the trial often
become their decisions later. It is possible that ajuror may be less prone to form and hold
to an early opinion if he or she hears that others view the evidence differently.
Discussions with other jurors may suggest to a juror different perspectives and
interpretations that will lead to more thoughtful and open-minded consideration of the
case. Although the benefits of relaxing the traditional rule are not provable, the rule's
disadvantages seem sufficiently clear to justify jettisoning this unnatural and burdensome
restriction.
Id. at 142-43 (citation omitted).
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could gain the benefit of improved comprehension by allowing jurors to
talk with each other about what they hear and see as the trial progress-
es.
245
He concludes by making it clear that certain parts of the current admonition
should still be given:
Judges should, of course, continue to instruct jurors not to talk about the
case to, or in the presence of, anyone not on the jury under any circum-
stances, to keep an open mind during the trial, and eventually to reach a
verdict only after full discussion with all the other jurors.2 4'
If the legitimate concerns sought to be addressed by the current admonition
are recognized, jurors could exercise their "speaking rights" consistent with
the parties' rights to a fair trial. Indeed, the quality of the whole trial, and its
outcome, would likely be enhanced for everyone.
Both Professors Austin and Friedland have studied juries extensively
Professor Austin characterizes the total ban on juror discussions as "anachro-
nis[tic]," while Professor Friedland characterizes this ban as conducive to
"deficient jury functioning." 247 Attributing this and some other current
restrictions on juror activism to paternalistic and distrustful attitudes toward
jurors on the part of judges and lawyers, Professor Friedland argues that such
negative attitudes are both unwise as a matter of policy and not justified by
the data. He concludes that jurors themselves should be active participants in
defining "the parameters of the decisionmaking process. '248 The limitation
on juror discussions should be reexamined, he says, since, although it assists
in promoting appearances of juror neutrality, it interferes with learning and
comprehension to too great a degree.2 49 These changes should lead to more
efficient and responsible decision makers.250
Neither state nor federal case law precludes modifying present practice to
allow jurors to discuss the evidence before deliberation. As a predicate, it
should be noted that a verdict will not be disturbed where predeliberation
juror discussions have been proven,25' absent a showing that the jurors
involved decided the merits prematurely or that prejudicial outside information
245. Id. at 142.
246. Id. at 143.
247. Friedland, supra note 4, at 199; Austin, supra note 6, at 18.
248. Fnedland, supra note 4, at 207-08; see also Schwazer, supra note 1, at 143 ("The jury's
judgment of what it needs should be respected within reasonable limits.").
249. Friedland, supra note 4, at 199.
250. Id. at 206-12.
251. Problems of proof are presented by the rules of most junsdictions. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
606(b); State v. Frazier, 683 S.W.2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Cnm. App. 1984).
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was introduced into the decision-making process.252 Second, although the
cases are divided on the question of whether the trial judge commits
reversible error by affirmatively instructing the jurors that they may discuss
the evidence among themselves subject to certain conditions,253 the well-
reasoned cases approve such instructions as long as the jurors are also told not
to make up their minds on the merits until deliberations commence.254 A
strong case can be made that, except in a few jurisdictions, current law does
not forbid experimenting with properly drawn instructions that allow jurors
to discuss the evidence among themselves before formal deliberations begin.
3. A Suggested Procedure and Jury Instruction
Given the law's legitimate concern about jurors making up their minds
before hearing all the evidence, arguments of counsel, and final instructions,
and given the current state of behavioral science research on the subject, a
jury instruction can be framed that grants, defines, and limits juror "speaking
rights." Such an instruction can also enhance jurors' participation and
comprehension, and accommodate their natural need to speak about what they
hear and see, while, at the same time, preserving litigants' rights to a hearing
252. Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding no error), cert. dented, 489 U.S.
1071 (1989); People v. Gilyard, 260 N.E.2d 364 (I11. App. Ct. 1970) (same), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 911
(1971); Copeland v. Town of Amboy, 543 N.Y.S.2d 816 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (same); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Hulvey, 353 S.E.2d 747 (Va. 1987) (same). Contra Lukstas v. Saint Francis Hosp., 583
A.2d 941 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (finding error where a subset of jurors deliberated case by themselves
during recess). See generally Dale R Agthe, Annotation, Propriety and Effect ofJurors" Discussion of
Evidence Among Themselves Before Final Submission of Criminal Case, 21 A.L.R.4th 444 (1983)
(collecting and analyzing cases involving discussions among jurors but not with outside parties).
253. Meggs v. Fair, 621 F.2d 460 (1st Cir. 1980) (upholding "affirmative" instruction); United States
v. Lemus, 542 F.2d 222 (4th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 947 (1977); Wilson v. State, 242
A.2d 194 (Md. Ct. Special App. 1968) (same), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1977). But see Winebrenner
v. United States, 147 F.2d 322 (8th Cir.) (holding that giving an "affirmative" instruction constitutes
reversible error), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 863 (1945); Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 343 N.E.2d 402
(Mass. 1976) (disapproving of similar instructions); People v. Hunter, 121 N.W.2d 442 (Mich. 1963)
(same).
254. The trial judge's instruction permittingjury discussions in Meggs was remarkable for its insight
and candor.
[I~t's only natural that you're going to talk about this case at recesses and probably at
lunchtime, and it's perfectly all right to talk about a witness' testimony. In other words,
it might be that you might ask another juror did she say that? What was your understand-
ing of what she said[?] That's perfectly all right.
The only thing I want to caution you on is not to come to a conclusion. Don't
commit yourself one way or the other until you hear all the evidence and hear arguments
and then my instructions.
Meggs, 621 F.2d at 463 (citation omitted).
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by a jury that will not decide the case until it hears from both sides and the
judge.
Proposed Jury Instruction: Juror Discussions
1. I want to talk with you about who you can speak with during this trial,
what you can speak about, and why you should keep an open mind about
both the issues in the case and about who should win or lose until the trial
has ended and you have started to deliberate.
2. As you hear the evidence in the case, you may have questions you want
to ask or discuss with other jurors. You may do this if you wish. For
example, you may not be certain that a witness said a particular thing. You
may not have understood some testimony. You may have a question about
an exhibit that the jury has seen. These are the kinds of questions you may
take up with each other.
3. However, I ask you to do three important things if you do discuss the
evidence with each other:
a. First, do not make your minds up about any issue in the case,
especially about guilt or innocence [who should win the case], until
you have heard all the evidence from both sides, all the arguments of
the attorneys, and the final instructions of law. Obviously, it would
not be fair to the litigants if any one of you made up your mind
about the case without hearing all the evidence. If you do not hear
about the law that applies to the case before you make up your
minds, you may make a decision that is wrong for legal reasons. You
will also need to hear the attorneys summarize and argue their cases.
Remember, you took an oath to decide this case on the basis of the
evidence-that means all the evidence-and the law I will give you
at the end of the case.
b. Second, I ask that you be careful not to discuss the evidence with
another juror while the trial is going on in the courtroom. That may
distract other jurors. Besides, all of you need to carefully listen to the
evidence and observe the witnesses while they testify.
c. Third, do not discuss the evidence with another juror if any person
who is not a juror is around or may hear you.
4. To conclude, I want to remind you of my earlier instruction concerning
who you should not talk to about the case. It comes down to this-during
the trial you may talk with each other about the evidence, following the
guidelines I have just read to you. However, you may not talk to any other
person about the case until your verdict has been read in court and you
have been told by me that your service in this case has ended.
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B. Interacting With Deliberating Jurors At or Near Impasse
1. Maximizing Chances for a Verdict at the First Trial
This proposal for interacting with jurors has received very little attention in
published opinions or from legal commentators.255 Some judges, in an
attempt to avoid a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury, have probably utilized
one or more elements of this proposal in trying to discern what else could
have been done to salvage a verdict in the first trial. What is suggested here,
however, is a structured dialogue among the jurors, judge, and trial attorneys
when deliberating jurors reach an impasse and are unable to render a verdict.
At this point, I propose that the judge, with or without the consent of counsel,
respond by asking the jurors to consider listing the issues or questions that
continue to divide them and that, if addressed further in the courtroom, might
help bring about a verdict. Upon receiving the jury's response, the judge
might decide that one or more measures are called for: clarifying previous
instructions or the giving of additional instructions, directing further argument
by counsel on selected points, or allowing further evidence on certain discrete
issues. Depending on the abilities of the jurors, judge, and lawyers to
articulate the divisive issues and to frame additional helpful instructions,
arguments, or other responses, and depending on how many jurors have
positions on the case that are subject to modification based on new informa-
tion, the technique holds significant promise both for reducing the number of
mistrials due to deadlocked juries and for producing more accurate verdicts.
There is a category of cases, of course, that will result in a hung jury
despite the heroic efforts of all involved. Many trial juries deadlock for no
apparent reason in what appear to be cases thoroughly tried and readily
susceptible of resolution-for example, there may have been an unreasonable
and intransigent juror. Whatever the reason, nothing short of blatant coercion
could force a verdict from some juries. However, there are a large number of
cases where a declaration of mistrial quickly follows the first indication that
the jury is deadlQcked. The judge and one or both of the attorneys may
experience substantial frustration at knowing neither what prevented a verdict
nor what they might have done differently to avoid an expensive, time-
consuming, and often needless new trial. These are the types of cases for
255. But see SYMPOsiUM REPORT, supra note 78, at 22-23. In an unpublished opinion, Judge
Newbiatt, a federal trial judge, utilized a similar procedure when he ordered reargument by counsel on
discreet issues listed by a deliberating jury, all in hopes of avoiding a mistrial due to a deadlocked
panel. Withers v. Ringlem, 745 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
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which this proposal is especially well-suited. Instead of engaging in after-the-
fact speculation about matters such as what caused the jury to hang, what one
could have done earlier in the trial, or what one might do differently in the
next trial, why not ask the jurors? At the first logical opportunity, ask them
what is troubling them and then do everything reasonably possible to respond
to their concerns and needs in the hope of helping them understand and decide
the case so that a mistrial will not be necessary
Despite suggestions to the contrary,256 the risk of mistrials due to dead-
locked juries is intolerably high. Unfortunately, there is no data documenting
the dimensions of the problem. However, even if, contrary to this writer's
experience and those of many fellow trial judges, the rate of mistrial due to
a deadlocked jury is relatively low, the substantial direct and indirect
economic, human, and social costs involved in one trial, let alone two or more
in the same case, should be avoided by following this simple, logical
procedure. It has been said that the only thing worse than trying a case once
is having to try it twice. To that it should be added-the only thing worse
than trying a case twice because of a hung jury is doing so without taking
reasonable measures at the first trial to maximize the chances of a verdict.
The state of the case law regarding the court's relationship with deliberating
juries appears to allow this sort of dialogue, followed by further proceedings
in open court. For example, the trial judge has discretion to reopen during
deliberations for read-backs of testimony or for further instructions, argument,
or evidence.257 Indeed, it may be an abuse of discretion to fail to reopen the
trial to permit additional critical evidence potentially favorable to the
accused."' In one case, a new instruction given after the jury had reached
a verdict was upheld where the judge had not been told what the verdict
was. 259 Of course, there are important limitations on dealings with jurors
after an indication that they have reached impasse. Among other things, the
court must take care not to coerce a verdict or to influence the jurors to
decide a particular way 260
256. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 144, at 156 (arguing that the risk of hung juries is "de mmnmum,"
relying on the fact that in 38 years on the bench, he has had only five hung junes-four criminal and
one civil). But see Gnsham & Lawless, supra note 226 (surveying 500,cnminal jurors in New Mexico
20 years ago and finding that as many as one-third of the juries reached impasse).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Burger, 419 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1969); Fernandez v. United States,
329 F.2d 899 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1964); Henry v. United States, 204 F.2d 817 (6th
Cir. 1953); People v. Scott, 465 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Monroe County Ct. 1983).
258. See, e.g., United States v. Bayer, 156 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1946), rev'd, 331 U.S. 785 (1947); State
v. Wolf, 207 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1965).
259. State v. Govan, 744 P.2d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
260. See Henry, 204 F.2d 817; State v. McCutcheon, 723 P.2d 666 (Ariz. 1986); People v. Carter,
442 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1968), overruled by People v. Gainder, 566 P.2d 997 (Cal. 1977).
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If the trial judge never knows that a deliberating jury is having difficulty
in making progress toward a verdict, it seems improper for the judge to
inquire whether there are areas of disagreement that warrant further proceed-
ings. However, once the court learns that an apparent impasse may result or
has been reached, it is appropriate, and wholly consistent with the public
interest in avoiding another trial in the case, to give the jury the option, even
if they do not solicit help, of telling the judge and lawyers which issues
continue to divide them in the event further proceedings might be of
assistance. It is also reasonable to assume that jurors who are unable to agree
on a verdict may have some questions about the law or the evidence that, if
addressed further, might change some views and even some votes. Conducting
such a dialogue, if properly structured and worded,26 ' does not seem
coercive or suggestive of a judge's preference for a particular verdict.
2. A Case Study
The technique of interacting with deliberating jurors who are at or near
impasse was recently employed in an Arizona court in an attempt to avoid
hopeless deadlock. Following trial, all of the participants were interviewed by
this writer to learn of their reactions and whether the procedure had merit.
State v. Knapp,26 2 a murder case being retried for the third time in
Phoenix, Arizona, in late 1991, consumed about ten weeks of trial. Closing
arguments lasted one day and the final jury instructions were twenty-seven
pages long. After days of deliberations, the twelve-person jury sent Judge
Martone a note telling him that they were at an impasse.263 After receiving
the note, Judge Martone read an ABA-approved,. modified "Allen charge"
2 4
to the jury, and the jury returned to its deliberations. One and one-half days
later, the foreperson sent out a second note-this one an obvious plea for
261. For a suggested form of offer of assistance to the jury, see infra part IV.BA.
262. CR90-08222 (Sup. Ct., Mancopa County, Ariz. filed Dec. 3, 1991). The trial was presided over
by Frederick J. Martone, who has since been elevated to the Arizona Supreme Court. The defendant had
spent 12 years on death row since the verdict in the first trial. A new trial was eventually ordered in a
habeas corpus proceeding m the trial court. Id.
263. Jury Note (Message, Nov. 25, 1991), Knapp, CR90-08222 (copy on file with the Indiana Law
Journal). The note stated: "We are stuck and at this point we feel it is a deadlock-Where do we go
from here?" Id.
264. The ABA reworked the so-called "dynamite charge" approved in Allen v. United States, 164
U.S. 492 (1896), and recommended the use of its version when remstructing juries thought to be at an
impasse in their deliberations. See STANDARDS FOR CRIUMINAL JusTicE Standard 15AA(a), (b) (Am. Bar
Ass'n, 2d ed. 1982). The ABA and others have viewed the older "Allen charge" as being too intrusive
and coercive. Id.
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assistance.26 After conferring with the attorneys, and over the strenuous
objections of defense counsel,266 the judge responded to the jurors with a
written offer of assistance by him and counsel.2 6' He asked them, if they
wished, to identify and list the areas of disagreement that counsel could
address further.26' The judge's answer emphasized his desire to assist, not
to force a verdict.269 Two days later, the jury responded with a list of
several points and concerns."' The jurors were returned to the courtroom,
where counsel were each allowed one hour for supplemental argument dealing
solely with the matters raised by the jury's response.2 ' After being invited
to deliberate further, the jury was returned to the jury room. However, one
265. The note read: "Because of our situation at this point, as foreperson I am at a loss as to how
to help this jury reach a decision. Could you give me some help." Jury Note (Message, Nov. 26, 1991),
Knapp, CR90-08222 (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
266. The attorneys were given overnight to research and consider the question. The prosecutor
favored following the suggestion of the judge. For an explanation of the positions of counsel for both
sides, see infra note 274 and accompanying text.
267. Jury Note (Reply, Nov. 26, 1991), Knapp, CR90-08222 (copy on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
268. Id.
269. The full text of the note to the jurors read:
The following is offered to facilitate your deliberative processes, not to force you to
reach a verdict.
You may wish to identify areas of agreement and areas of disagreement You may
then wish to discuss the law and the evidence as they relate to areas of disagreement
If you still have disagreement, you may wish to identify for the court and counsel
which issues of law or fact you would like counsel to argue further to you. If you elect
this option, please list in writing the issues you would like argued. We will then ask
counsel to address these issues in supplementary arguments promptly.
We do not wish to force a verdict We are merely trying to be responsive to your
request for help. If it is reasonably probable that you could reach a verdict by supplemen-
tal arguments, it would be wise to give it a try.
Id.
270. Jury Note (Message, Dec. 2, 1991), Knapp, CR90-08222 (copy on file with the Indiana Law
Journal). The jury's response was a laundry list of the individual members' concerns, and it reflected
their division over most of the basic issues in the case:
In response to your offer for assistance we have determined the following areas to
be areas of disagreement. Missing evidence, unburned carpet in the doorway, the
confession flash-over concept, John's character, John's inconsistencies, ability of the girls
to set the fire with just matches and paper. If you believe the confession must you believe
all of it? Is the confession the state's case?
Id.
271. After discussing the jury's list of issues and questions with the attorneys, Martone told the
jurors:
Thank you. The lawyers will be given 1 hour per side to address these issues.
Again, we do not wish to compel you to reach a verdict. If at any time you feel no
further progress can be made, please let me know.
Jury Note (Reply, Dec. 2, 1991), Knapp, CR90-08222 (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
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and one-half days later the jurors reported that they were hopelessly
deadlocked and Judge Martone declared a mistrial.272
Within a month of the trial's end, all participants were interviewed
concerning their experiences with this attempt to salvage a verdict through
active dialogue among the jurors, the judge, and the lawyers. With the
exception of the two defense attorneys, who experienced mixed reactions
ranging from initial curiosity to eventual outright opposition, all participants
were positive and recommended its use in future cases even though a verdict
did not result in the Knapp case.
Given all of the jurors' questions, confusion, deep division, and need to
make themselves heard, the twelve jurors unanimously welcomed Judge
Martone's offer of assistance. 273 Their initial reactions to the invitation were
extremely positive, including feelings of gratitude for a welcome opportunity
to receive some help. The jurors had felt desperately divided and at a dead
end, but believed that Judge Martone's offer of assistance provided some
hope, if not the only hope, of resolving the case with a verdict. They reported
difficulties in compiling their list for the judge, due to the widely disparate
concerns and areas of confusion of individual jurors, and the rancorous debate
that had preceded their first report of impasse. Nevertheless, all were pleased
with the invitation to talk with the judge and attorneys about the case for the
first time since jury selection. Not suprisingly, the jurors reported substantial
frustration relating to their perceived inability to ask questions during the trial
and their unsatisfactory experience with questions earlier in deliberations.
The jurors did not share the concern of the defense lawyers-that the
judge's offer for the jurors to list divisive issues would somehow intrude upon
272. Knapp, CR90-08222.
273. All of the jurors were eager to talk about their experiences with this dialogue and the
supplemental argument by counsel. Many jurors were surprised to learn that the technique was not in
common use. The jurors learned during their deliberations that this was the first known use of this
procedure with an Arizona jury when one juror read and reported a newspaper article to the other jurors
prior to the jury's return note listing issues for the judge. Interviews with Jurors in Knapp, CR90-08222
(Feb. 3, 1992) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal). As a part of this case study, the twelve
jurors were all asked the following questions with appropriate follow-up:.
1. What was your initial individual reaction to Judge Martone's offer?
2. Given the tight secrecy that surrounds jury deliberations, did you feel the judge was being
intusive or invading the jury's privacy?
3. How did you decide what to list in your answer to the judge? Was that a difficult process?
4. Did the supplemental closing argument of counsel meet your expectations?
5. Did the entire effort help you, other jurors or the jury as a group? Was it worthwhile, given
your continued inability to reach a verdict?
6. Would you recommend its use in future cases where the jury signals that it has reached an
impasse?
The prosecutor and the defense counsel for the case were interviewed as well.
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the sanctity or privacy of their deliberations. No juror felt that the deliberation
process or their own individual thought processes were compromised. As a
matter of fact, they dismissed this suggestion with the response that sharing
questions and confusion with those that could help was a natural and logical
thing to do. Their reactions to the supplemental closing argument that
followed were mixed. Many were pleased to find their recollections,
understandings, and views in the case confirmed by counsel. Some complained
that the lawyers seemed ill-prepared for additional argument. Only one juror
reported a change of mind as a result of the process.
Despite their inability to achieve unanimity, all of the jurors believed that
the dialogue was a positive development, that it was worth the time and
trouble, and that it should be used in future cases where the jury evidences
difficulties in reaching a decision. Furthermore, they were enthusiastic about
this rare opportunity "to be heard from" and perplexed about why they had
been forced to "sit on their hands" up to that point in the trial.
The prosecutor thought that this novel procedure was a net positive, worthy
of being tried again in other cases. His initial positive reaction to the
suggestion was tempered by his belief that the judge would likely be reversed
on appeal. However, he saw no downside for the prosecution, since the only
alternative was a mistrial due to jury deadlock. In either event, the state
would be faced with a new trial. The prosecutor also felt that the technique
held some hope for moving the jury one way or the other-that is, until he
saw the list of issues the jurors' wished counsel had addressed. All of the
attorneys felt that the jury's listed issues were so broad and numerous that the
lawyers could not be of much help in only one hour of additional argument.
Although curious about the procedure from an intellectual viewpoint, the
defense attorneys' reactions included apprehension over the lack of legal
precedent for the technique and experimenting with it in a capital case. As
advocates for their client, they argued that the procedure was coercive and an
undue invasion of the jury's province, citing the rights of the jurors to decide
the case for any or no reason, with the jurors' expectations that they will
never be called upon to reveal any of their thoughts or thought processes to
anyone outside the deliberating room. Defense counsel also preferred a hung
jury, and a resulting mistrial, to risking a verdict following use of this
procedure. Finally, they did not recommend its use again absent some legal
authority, unless its potential for coercion was eliminated and the inquiry
limited to more discrete issues.274
274. Ironically, one defense counsel complained that he felt like a "school teacher" while rearguing
his case. The analogy is entirely apt, given the potential of this procedure for educating and assisting
jurors to refocus on the task at hand. After all, one would expect a teacher to respond similarly to
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The trial judge in Knapp strongly believed in the propriety of using this
technique in the case, especially since the jurors expressly requested help. He
thought he would have been upheld on appeal if a conviction had followed,
since only the most tradition-bound judges would condemn the procedure. He
also saw no downside, since a mistrial was the only alternative. Although an
explicit request by the jury makes a stronger case for its use, Judge Martone
agreed that the technique ought to be used, and upheld, in situations where the
risk of jury impasse is manifest, whether or not the jurors expressly ask the
judge or lawyers for help. He was not persuaded by complaints of coercion
or invasion of the jury's privacy, given that he did not request or command,
but rather invited the jurors to consider listing troublesome and divisive
issues, and that he repeatedly stated that he did not want to force a verdict.
Judge Martone said that it insulted the jurors' intelligence for counsel to
suggest that the jury could be divided over nothing at all, as opposed to
divisive, substantive issues capable of definition. His only reservation about
reopening for further argument was that the opportunity might tempt counsel
to inject material ensuring a mistrial. However, that concern was not realized
in the Knapp case. Thus, all of the trial participants in this case, except
defense counsel, thought this attempt at dialogue with a deliberating jury at
apparent impasse was a positive device and a worthwhile effort to salvage a
verdict by addressing jurors' questions.
3. Reopening for Further Evidence or Instructions
Responding to deliberating jurors' questions and concerns with additional
argument by counsel, though objectionable to some, would seem to raise few
serious legal or practical problems. The Knapp case illustrates ths.2 75 While
the judge's note to the Knapp jury did not foreclose juror questions about the
legal instructions, it certainly was not a clear invitation to submit questions
about the law 276 Jurors ought to be clearly informed of all appropriate
options, that is, of their right to list and return questions about the evidence,
students experiencing the same difficulties with an assignment or project. Of course, the timing, content,
and follow-up, among other things, may vary from the classroom to the courtroom, but the need, logic,
and basic learning principles are much the same. Thus, lawyers and judges will feel more like educators
as practices based upon the behavioral-educational-active model of the jury supplant the traditional legal-
adversanal-passive one.
275. In another recent case where the jury was reportedly at impasse, a federal trial judge based his
order for additional argument upon the "inherent powers of the Court to control argument." He also
concluded that the procedure was not coercive, did not otherwise prejudice either party, and was "a
particularly effective tool to avoid costly and unnecessary mistrials leading to retrials." Withers v.
Ringlem, 745 F. Supp. 1272, 1274 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
276. For the text of the judge's note to the jury, see supra note 269.
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the instructions, and even the deliberative or decision-making process
itself.2" Jury responses calling for the trial judge to clarify or explain
earlier instructions or to give additional appropriate instructions ought to be
fully answered by the judge in the courtroom. When finished with any
supplemental instructions, the judge ought to ask whether the jurors' questions
were adequately addressed and whether there are any further questions.7
As with reopening for further argument by counsel, the giving of additional
necessary instructions, as suggested by the jury's response, would seem to
present a relatively low risk from a legal point of view
Why not permit additional evidence if requested by the jury9 Compared to
reopening for additional instructions or argument, the giving of more evidence
to a deliberating jury seems to provoke more objections among trial lawyers
and judges, probably because it offends more game-theory notions of trial
than do the other procedures. However, cases are legion upholding a trial
judge's discretion in permitting reopening for additional evidence where the
relevant information was omitted through the inadvertence of one of the
attorneys or of the trial judge.279 If we can accommodate our own needs,
why not the reasonably felt needs of the jurors? The request for otherwise
admissible evidence coming from the decision makers themselves seems to
make an appropriate case for supplementing the evidence.80
Assuming, then, that the jury's request calls for additional evidence that is
relevant and nonprivileged, and that obtaining and presenting such evidence
would not be too problematic in terms of cost and delay, why not allow it?
It goes without saying that both sides would have an opportunity to address
the new material, both at the evidence phase and with reargument.2 si
What have traditionally been viewed as untimely and unwelcome risky
problems-questions from deliberating juries requesting or suggesting further
proceedings-should, under the educational model of the trial, be thought of
as opportunities to assist jurors in their frequently awesome task of reaching
a verdict. When it comes to seeking information from and supplying
information to deliberating juries, what is needed is a modification or
"stretching" of the current adversarial model and its players.
277. For a suggested invitation to dialogue, see infra part IV.B.4.
278. This familiar teaching technique is especially well-suited for helping jurors understand legal
instructions. See supra text accompanying notes 209-10.
279. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Propriety of Reopening Criminal Case in Order to Present
Omitted or Overlooked Evidence, After Submission to Jury But Before Return of Verdict, 87 A.L.R.2d
849 (1963).
280. See Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 614, 615-16 (5th Cir. 1968); People v. Scott, 465
N.Y.S.2d 819, 820 (Monroe County Ct. 1983).
281. See Scott, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
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4. Inviting Dialogue: A Proposed Jury Instruction
The following is suggested as an additional jury instruction, to be given
after learning that the jurors are having difficulty reaching a verdict or as a
response to a jury's request for help.282
This instruction is offered to help you make a decision, not to force
you to reach a verdict or to suggest what your verdict should be.
It may be helpful for you to identify areas of agreement and areas of
disagreement. You may then wish to discuss the law and the evidence as
they relate to areas of disagreement.
If you still have disagreement, I invite you to identify for me any
issues or questions about the evidence, the final instructions of law, or the
deliberation process with which you would like assistance from me or
counsel. If you choose this option, please list, in writing, the issues where
further assistance might help bring about a verdict.
To repeat, I do not wish or intend to force a verdict. I am merely
trying to answer your apparent need for help. If it might help you reach a
verdict, it would be wise to give it a try.
This instruction is intended to elicit enough meaningful information about
divisive issues to permit the structuring of helpful supplemental proceedings.
There is nothing coercive about it.
CONCLUSION: AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE
There is much to do if American jury practices are to be brought into line
with reality, if juror comprehension is to be enhanced, and if the institution
of the jury is to be strengthened. Some experts fear that the prospects for real
improvement are not good without major changes, especially attitudinal
changes on the parts of judges and trial lawyers.83
The most frequently mentioned predicates necessary to meaningful change
in jurors' roles at trial include the following:
(1) Judges and lawyers must exhibit a greater willingness to break with the
past when presented with new ideas.8 4
282. The suggested instruction is based upon the one submitted to the jurors in Knapp, CR90-08222
(Sup. Ct., Mancopa County, Anz., filed Dec. 3, 1991), the text of which is found at supra note 269.
Several stylistic changes have been made.
283. Steele & Thornburg, supra note 58, at 254.
284. JAMES MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY iN CoNFLIcr 155, 158 (2d ed. 1980); Forston, supra
note 70, at 637; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 230, at 238.
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(2) The legal profession's traditional bias against social science research and
its results should be reexamined and modified, if not discarded altogeth-
er.
28 5
(3) The one-dimensional view of the trial as an adversarial contest should
be substantially qualified by the need to meet educational objectives.86
(4) The trial participants who are "invested" in the present system need to
consider the interests and future of the justice system as a whole, as
opposed to narrow self-interest. 7
(5) The same kind of attention that has been "lavished" on the pretrial stage
should now be directed to the trial itself.
28
(6) Lawyers and judges should be willing to make appropriate "trade-offs"
in the adversarial model in exchange for the benefits promised by these
and similar proposals for greater juror participation in the trial. 8 9
(7) The legal profession must recognize the need for empirical validation of
some of the proposals through social science research and evaluation and
the profession must cooperate in and support these efforts.290
(8) Adequate public and private funding must be allocated for the necessary
research and testing and the implementation and management of needed
changes.'29
(9) Appellate courts should be more willing to support innovative trial
judges by approving changes in the trial intended to enhance juror
comprehension.292
285. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 72, 239-40.
What is required is social invention in the law based on findings of the social
sciences.
In the law there is an unwillingness to expenment-sometimes for good reason,
dealing as it does with life in the living-but pnncipally, one suspects, because lawyers
have intellectual and emotional investment in their fictions
MARSHALL, supra note 284, at 155, 158; accord Elwork & Sales, supra note 129, at 294-95; Wallace
D. Loh, The Evidence and Trial Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE,
supra note 130, at 36-38. For a discussion of practical suggestions for the collection and use of social
science research by courts, see John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science
Research, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 571 (1991).
286. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 100-04; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 135.
287. Frankel, supra note 6, at 222; Steele & Thomburg, supra note 58, at 254.
288. Strawn & Munsterman, supra note 52, at 444, 447, repnnted in IN THE JURY BOX, supra note
52, at 181, 185-86.
289. Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 120.
290. MARSHALL, supra note 284, at 155, 158; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 237, at 238-39. Future
such study is "clearly warranted." Blanck, supra note 64, at 800.
291. Forston, supra note 70, at 637. The Federal Judicial Center, the National Center for State
Courts, and the State Justice Institute are natural and logical candidates to promote and support these
and otherjury trial innovations.
292. Forston, supra note 70, at 637; Steele & Thornburg, supra note 58, at 253.
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(10) Appellate courts need to develop, announce, and enforce their own
standards of clarity and comprehension for communicating with
jurors.29
(11) Judges and lawyers should regularly meet and talk with jurors in
informal settings following trial, and they should listen to what jurors
have to say about the trial process and whether jurors' needs are being
met.294
(12) To implement, monitor, evaluate, and subsequently modify such changes,
inter-disciplinary committees or commissions need to be established in
place of the traditional bench-bar committees. Appropriate social
sciences as well as jurors should be represented on such committees.295
The aim of this last proposed change in process is not to turn over trials and
trial procedures to social scientists and educators. Rather, the goal is to
improve the jury trial and the results of that process. This can be accom-
plished by working with our counterparts in sister disciplines- and utilizing
their knowledge and experience as a means to these ends. Social scientists
who are experts in these matters seek nothing more:
[Psychological research] cannot displace the normative judgments that
are inherent in the law, but it can help make the law better informed. To
paraphrase Thorstein Veblen, the outcome of psychological research should
be to provoke a second question where only one question was raised
before.2
96
293. Elwork et al., supra note 190, at 176; Steele & Thornburg, supra note 58, at 253. For a recent
example of reliance upon empirical data to reject, on grounds of incomprehensibility, a commonly used
jury instruction m negligence cases, see Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991). A similar
approach may be taken in reversing a murder conviction, given survey results showing that 75% of the
prospective jurors who read commonly used death penalty instructions exhibited misunderstanding.
Arthur S. Hayes, Jurors' Grasp of Instructions May Stir Appeal, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1992, at BI.
294. Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 135.
295. Steele & Thornburg, supra note 58, at 254; Strawn & Munsterman, supra note 52, at 447,
repnnted in IN THE JuRY Box, supra note 52, at 186.
296. Loh, supra note 285, at 38.
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